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ABSTRACT 
The exponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis have failed 
to provide a serious analysis of the political, economic and ideo-
logical trends of the period. They were wrong in their predictions 
that Marxism and radical ideologies would lose their power to moti-
vate. They were also wrong in their predictions that the two great 
ideological systems were converging. Not only did they fail to 
provide an analysis of the political, economic, and ideological trends 
of the period, but they also failed to provide a serious analysis 
of ideology as a concept. 
In an attempt to define ideology, I trace its appearance and 
usage in early, philosophical writings to such modern interpretations 
of the word as seen in the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries philos-
ophers ,: Marx, Mannheim, and Lukacs. A definition is presented • 
"Ideology is any more or less systematic set of ideas and thoughts 
which have been converted into beliefs explaining man's attitudes 
towards life and his existence in society and specifying a pattern of 
political action responsive to, and commensurate with, such ideas and 
thoughts." 
Another reason why attention is focused on the interpretation 
of ideology as presented by the above theorists is to demonstrate the 
validity of four propositions: First, ideology was part of a philos-
ophical conception of politics critical of all pre-modern conceptions 
of the political arrangements under which society was organized and not 
any justification of the existing order of things. Second, all later 
ideologies are attempts to resolve the basic theoretical and practical 
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problems posed by the original theory of ideology. Third, the 
contemporary ideological climate of thought is mainly the result 
of the vulgarization of the concept by Marxist theorists who attempted 
to provide an analysis of ideology. Fourth, the views held by the 
exponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis are similar to those who 
have provided the basic ideas for the formulation of the concept. 
The entire convergence thesis is based on the static assump-
tion about the momentary state of world politics and economics, and 
the thesis tends to disregard more fundamental differences among 
social institutions and attitudes. There is a conceptual confusion 
which tends to obscure the many-sided reality of the contemporary world. 
The convergence theory should be dismissed because it does not provide 
any evidence that ideologies are declining. It simply lends justifi-
cation to the accusation that the exponents of the decline thesis do 
not write as social scientists but as ideologues. 
Ideology has been seen as declining as a result of the 
emergence of a post-industrial society in which scientific knowledge 
and technology play a central role. This society is also characterized 
by high and widespread levels of economic well-being and affluence 
which lead to the disappearance of dissatisfaction. In short, all the 
dimensions of the post-industrial society are non-political. But 
these writers have not elaborated the political implications of"their 
concept. No systematic attention has been given to the nature of the 
post-industrial society. 
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Implicit in the writings of the exponents of the decline 
thesis is the assumption that there is an ultimate movement towards 
a static equilibrium of the social forces and a denial of moral and 
human ideals in the post-industrial society. But they have mis-
construed what happens to man's political interests, behavior and 
attitudes towards politics as society becomes more affluent. Several 
plausible hypotheses are examined with respect to the attitudinal 
change that may occur in the post-industrial and affluent society. 
- v -
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INTRODUCTION 
The decade between 1950 and 1960 is characterized by 
certain features which mistakenly were interpreted as a moderation 
of ideological conflict. Many political scientists hastened to 
hail the arrival of what they thought was an era of non-ideological 
politics. Non-ideological politics, they believed, resulted from 
the arrival of the mixed economy guided by what was alleged to be 
Keynesian theory. They believed that Social Democracy was eroding 
the foundations of both Marxism and capitalism. The politics of 
Social Democracy took on a messianic value because, it was believed, 
it would cure the evils of pure capitalism and marxist practice and 
theory. Just as in past apocalyptic and messianic periods, it was 
proclaimed that nothing but the sober truth was being told. This 
led many to proclaim the "end of ideology" thesis which was first 
advanced by Edward Shi Is at the Congress of Cultural Freedom which 
met in 1954 and later was endorsed and developed by Daniel Bell and 
Seymour Martin Lipset. The central message in this thesis was that 
ideology was at an end because fundamental social conflict was at an 
end. The advocates of this thesis maintained that there were no 
longer any social roots for politics which proposed a revolutionary 
transformation of the social order. Bell asserted that critics who 
had articulated the revolutionary impulses of the past had abandoned 
the chiliastic hopes, millenarianism and apocalyptic thinking which 
signified the end of ideology. 
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The advocates of the thesis of the decline of ideology argued 
that after World War II there was little concern with the conflicting 
political ideologies that had guided the masses and parties of the 
past. Societies, it was further argued, were overcoming the tensions 
and contradictions that had threatened the stability of the past. 
Societies were adapting rapidly by their high standards of living, 
full employment, and by means of economic expansion to social problems 
that had beset them in the past. Societies, including the Soviet 
Union, appeared to be following a pattern of stabilization. The 
political scientists who took up this approach were less interested in 
knowing the mechanisms of social change than they were in discovering 
the mechanisms of social equilibrium that would ensure continued 
stability. Thus their conception of society was not dynamic: it was 
functional and integrative. 
In the third chapter of this paper I will consider the debate 
of those who maintained that politics is a matter of pragmatic com-
promise within an agreed framework of basic values, a framework which 
depends upon a consensus which has arrived by means of the institutions 
of the Welfare State and the economic and political domestication of 
the working class. In support of their thesis they have argued that 
the rival and competing interests which had been allowed expression 
within the official political order would no longer breed disruptive 
conflict. They also asserted that the presentation of ideological 
world views which might guide and inform politics of passionate conflict 
would henceforth be out of place in the advanced industrial society. 
- 3 -
This industrial society would be capable of absorbing disruptive 
conflict by its capacity to satisfy basic needs. But the issue has 
been misconstrued in several ways and these writers failed to diagnose 
correctly the nature of that to which they were sensitive. A con-
sensus and low political participation in active politics promotes 
democratic and peaceful political and social processes while con-
flict and widespread participation tends to go hand in hand with 
totalitarianism and authoritarianism and therefore in both cases it is 
meaningful to speak of ideological politics. Liberalism in the 
United States, in its effort to promote its values, has succeeded to 
a large extent to create a consensus by adopting certain policies 
which are advocated by its rivals. 
Science and technology which, according to these theorists, 
will free decision-making from distortions and which will insulate 
politics from the influence of ideology, are likely to be influenced 
by ideological convictions and be limited or inhibited by the dominance 
of particular ideologies. Also, once man is liberated from the 
economic and, in general, the material needs he will be preoccupied 
with the fulfilment of spiritual aspirations. In short, the advanced 
industrial society is likely to generate tensions and contradictions 
which will threaten any stability that we might have enjoyed in the 
past or may be enjoying at the present. 
The writers of the decline-of-ideology thesis also appear to 
have confused the e<haustion of ideology with the exhaustion of Marxism, 
radicalism and, in general, revolutionary politics. At times it appears 
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that the end-of-ideology thesis, far from proving that ideologies 
have ended, is itself an expression of the ideology of the time and 
place where it arose. One is reminded of the claims of classical 
Marxism. It was Marx who argued that the social roots of ideological 
thinking will be destroyed, that ideology will wither away with the 
arrival of communism. Similar assertions are found in the convergence 
theory which holds that a coming together of liberalism and Marxism 
eventually will lead to the emergence of the politics of social 
democracy. 
To support the thesis that the end-of-ideology thesis is 
itself part of an ideology, and thus is self-refuting, we must 
examine what Bell, Lipset, Shils and others understand by the expression 
"ideology". In chapter two I will be discussing these points at 
greater length. 
In the first chapter I will discuss the concept of ideology, 
dealing mainly with those writers who have seen ideology as being the 
reflection of base and super-structure of the society. To substantiate 
the thesis that the end of ideology hypothesis is itself ideological 
it is important to look at the concept of ideology as it was viewed 
by Marxists. Despite some differing views that we find among these 
theorists, their conceptions of ideology bear striking similarities. 
Equally important, we find a striking resemblance between those'who 
formulated the concept and most of the writers who have argued that 
ideologies have declined. According to those theorists whose con-
ception of ideology will be discussed, the chief forces which determine 
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the features of society and shape the thought and ideas of men is 
the mode of production. The mode of production of material life 
conditions the social, political and intellectual process in general. 
The production of material wealth dominates the production of ideas. 
When the base (the mode of production) changes there is a change in 
social views. Ideological activity is directed by the super-
structure, the institutions of society. Consequently, as the causes 
which give rise to class differences are abandoned, as society moves 
toward socialism, as capitalism is undermined, man's ideas become 
less and less distorted. Man acquires gradually knowledge of the 
historical laws which he applies to social relations. 
The manner in which most of the exponents of the decline-of-
ideology thesis treat the subject suggests that ideologies disappear 
with the creation of certain social and political institutions and 
norms. For these exponents, ideology comes to an end with the arrival 
of the mixed economy guided by socialist principles, in other words, 
with the arrival of the politics of Social Democracy. Whether dis-
tortions of reality, which supposedly are caused by ideologies, dis-
appear with the emergence of the communist society or the emergence of 
Social Democratic society is not important. What is important is that 
as a certain type of society emerges, people dispense with illusions. 
The similarities become apparent when we look at the defini-
tions of those who have provided the principal ideas for the development 
of the concept. As will be seen, according to those theorists ideo-
logies are for the most part post facto justifications or rationalizations 
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for the existing organization of society. Most of the exponents 
of the decline-of-ideology thesis hold similar views. For the 
leader of these exponents, Daniel Bell, ideology is an illusion. 
Ideologies, he asserts, are organized systems of belief with ready 
formulae for the manipulation of the masses. The manner in which 
Bell defines ideology, of course, can cover all ideologies, not just 
the "bourgeois" ideology. However, the elements of falsity, ration-
alization, distortion, and justification are the fundamental com-
ponents according to many contemporary political scientists. 
Ideology is seen as that set of ideas with which a society justifies 
and mythologizes itself. Talcott Parsons is closer to the Marxist 
view than anyone else. For him, ideology is the deviation from 
scientific objectivity. 
As stated previously, the equating of ideological theorizing 
with totalitarian and revolutionary politics is a central theme in 
most of the writers who deal with the decline of ideology and I will 
devote considerable attention to this theme. The viewing of ideology 
as revolutionary has given rise to the claim that the age of ideology 
has ended in a static, affluent social equilibrium and that this 
equilibrium and stability can be perpetuated by means of identifying 
the mechanisms of accommodation and equilibration. Such an analysis 
of the situation is faulty as I shall demonstrate by identifying" the 
sources which act as agents of social change and which exert pressure 
on society to move forward rather than remain static. I will also 
try to identify the causes that bring changes in the political attitudes 
and behavior of individuals and groups and thus upset any equilibrium 
that might have existed. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE DEFINITION OF IDEOLOGY 
When it comes to the definition of ideology there is so much 
variation that the term almost loses its meaning. There are those 
who hold the view that ideologies obtain, or aspire to obtain, their 
effects entirely through distortion and illusions, and a few who 
employ the term in a more neutral fashion. If we accept temporarily 
that ideologies are systems of partially oriented beliefs and atti-
tudes associated with social groups, then it is clear that the 
theoretical interest in the concept of ideology has not arisen only 
in modern times. In fact, interest in this area is older than the 
emergence of the term ideology itself. Bacon's criticism of the "idola", 
idols or preconceptions that deceive men and constitute obstacles in 
the path of true knowledge, is the earliest theoretical concern with 
the concept. Bacon regarded "idola" as being mainly the consequence of 
man's psychological constitution but he also attributed them to social 
factors J 
This line of thought has remained almost unbroken in the 
European intellectual tradition starting with Bacon and continuing to 
the modern concept of ideology. The term, however, first appeared in 
1. The Physical and Metaphysical Works of Bacon. Edited by 
Joseph Devey, Bell & Sons, London, 1891, p. 392. 
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the seventeenth century and during the eighteenth century the writers 
of the French Enlightenment contributed a great deal to the discussion 
of ideology. Ideology became the central concern of the philosophers 
although the term was not yet used widely. The philosophers were 
disturbed by the way in which nations, in fact, entire historical 
epochs, could be circumscribed by systems of beliefs, how belief 
systems prevented nations and entire populations from breaking the state 
of ignorance in which they were kept. Yet the term was destined to 
be associated with that mentality of thinking which is characterized 
by irrationality and has little appreciation for thought as an 
instrument for grasping reality. Not only were the philosophers 
disturbed but they were also fascinated and this aroused their interest 
in the study of belief systems. The philosophers believed that the 
root of all civil discord was the prejudicial quality of man's ideas 
about the nature and objects of political life. 
The question they wanted to answer, then, was how these pre-
judices could be eradicated and replaced with scientific and universally 
acknowledged ideas? The answer would be provided by a new education 
which would be based on the science of ideas which they called ideo-
logic. 
During the period of the French Revolution, Europe was en-
meshed in illusory traditions that were distilled and promoted b'y what 
the philosophers believed to be despots, the priest caste, and for 
purposes of keeping the masses in a state of ignorance. It was during 
this period that many devices were designed to break the grip of the 
- 9 -
familiar, to destroy the spell of prejudice, and, in general, to 
emancipate the masses from the force of habit and custom. Those who 
undertook this task were men like Descartes with his methodology of 
doubt which was directed primarily against the prevailing conceptions 
of reason and all claims that were made uncritically in its name, 
Rousseau with his ideas about the state of nature, and Montesquieu 
who introduced the inductive and historical approach to the study of 
politics and destroyed many traditional arguments used in justification 
of many prevailing conditions. 
We may say that although these men became interested in the 
study of belief systems, in reality they were becoming ideologues 
themselves. It is no wonder, then, that when ideology first made its 
appearance, its reputation was different from that of today. 
When De Tracy coined the word ideology he wanted to transform 
the mundane into knowledge. The use of ideology was the particular 
method that he proposed as universally applicable. Ideology was the 
science of ideas which was to provide the true foundation for all 
other sciences. It enabled thinkers to investigate and describe the 
manner in which human thoughts are constituted. De Tracy defined the 
science of ideas as follows: 
The science may be called ideology, if 
one considers only the subject-matter; 
general grammar, if one considers only 
the method; and logic, only if one con-
siders the purpose. Whatever the name, 
it necessarily contains those three 
subdivisions since one cannot be treated 
adequately without also treating the 
other two. Ideology seems to be the 
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generic term because the science of 
ideas subsumes both that of their 
expression and that of their deri-
vation^ 
Thus ideology began its career as an attempt to dispel illusions, to 
break the grip of illusions and the spell of prejudice. Ideology 
emerged as a reaction to the world in all realms of experience and 
gave a new impetus to the historical perspective. The ideologues felt 
that intellectual and political authorities were so strongly attached 
to prejudices that they were unable to understand reality. Ideo-
logical analysis was used to unmask preconceived notions and challenge 
established assumptions. It aspired to judge opinions and examine 
them critically. Even ideologies which appeared later were used to 
unmask the supposed hidden motives of their adversaries. But, of 
course, this was not the exclusive privilege of a certain group of 
thinkers or political men. Nothing could prevent the opponents of any 
group from availing themselves of the weapon and applying it to their 
opponents. Ideology acquired a pejorative connotation, the connotation 
that has been assigned to it by most writers, when the liberals, the 
philosophical group in France who sought to base the cultural sciences 
on anthropological and psychological foundations and the Institute 
they had formed,faded away. Napoleon labelled as ideologues all#those 
2. In Karl Mannheim. Ideology and Utopia. New York: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd., 1932, Translated by Edward Shils. 
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philosophers who stood in the way of his centralizing policies. 
"Thereby the word took on a derogatory meaning which, like the word 
'doctrinaire1, it has retained to the present day."3 It is used in 
contrast with all that is supposed to be realistic. Its more en-
compassing sense, to characterize the belief systems of social groups, 
dates back to the early writings of Marx. Marx wanted to trace 
"bourgeois" thought to ideological foundations and thereby to discredit 
it. Of course the first one to notice that social groups carry with 
them systems of outlook was Hegel. These systems of outlook were 
often more implicit than explicit. They were systems which limited 
conceptual horizons and influenced the answers men find as well as 
the very questions they tend to ask. However, it was through Marx 
who attached the word "ideology" to social belief systems that the con-
cept became more generally understood. Ideology has been given different 
interpretations. One is that ideology is a reflection of the economic 
infra-structure.Marx states: 
The production of ideas, of conceptions 
of consciousness is at first directly 
interwoven with the material activity 
and the material intercourse of men, the 
language of real life, Conceiving, 
thinking, the mental intercourse of men 
appears at this stage as the direct 
afflux of their material behavior. The 
3. Karl Mannheim. Ideology and Utopia, op. cit., p. 72. 
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same applies to mental production as 
expressed in the language of politics, 
laws, morality, religion, metaphysics 
of the people. Men are the producers 
of their conceptions, ideas, etc.-real, 
active men as they are conditioned by a 
definite development of the productive 
forces and of the intercourse corres-
ponding to these, up to its further forms.^ 
Ideology has been seen as a false consciousness which is the 
totally distorted mind and everything that comes within its range. 
Thus the "end of ideology", as Engels used the phrase, meant the time 
when men would achieve "true" consciousness, or the awareness of the 
direction of history and the material basis of society. But ideology 
can serve only as a masquerade. It is associated with illusions, 
dogmatic dreamings, and distortions of men. Ideology serves to mask 
from men the real nature of their condition as historical actors. 
According to Marx, however, ideology can not be expected to 
serve as an illusion for ever and to conceal the condition of man. 
The ruling class in the capitalist system would not be able to deceive 
men for ever. The systematic contradictions within the capitalist system 
would slowly awaken the working class from the "nightmare" of the past. 
Workers would begin the revolution by experiencing their 
grievances separately, each worker within the confines of his individual 
life. The factory system would provide a communal context for these 
grievances. Slowly the workers would become enlightened, connecting 
4. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The German Ideology. Moscow: 
Foreign Language Publishing House, 1947, p. 274. 
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personal grievances with group grievances, group grievances with 
social concerns, and social concerns with a scientific knowledge of 
social change. At each step, the workers would gain subtlety in their 
appreciation of the connection between their personal conditions, 
the conditions of their fellows and the nature of the system in 
which they played a part. Their grievances would eventually acquire 
a dynamic quality, leading them on in a problem-solving manner into 
social struggle and organization building. The working class would 
become the agency of its own liberation because ordinary men would 
acquire a sense for reality, a clear-sighted and determined apprecia-
tion of the "true conditions for working-class emancipation". The 
workers have remained unaffected by ideologies. 
Ideology, according to Marx, expresses the interests of a 
definite class and the fundamental features of all the forms of the 
social consciousness of this class. The ideology of the working 
class is Marxism, but this ideology refers to a harmonious scientific 
system of views expressing the fundamental interests of the proletariat 
and revealing the law-governed character of the social development that 
inevitably leads to communism. Once the workers are in power they 
will continue to exhibit the problem-solving scientific orientation 
they developed in the struggle. They are men who can dispense with 
illusions because they are dealing with the real problems of life from 
a historical perspective and not from an ideological perspective. 
While Marx asserted that his set of ideas was a science and not 
an ideology, Lenin reluctantly admitted that Marxism was itself an 
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ideology. He used the term ideology to mean the combat of ideas. 
In the hands of the people ideology becomes a means of revealing 
the opinion of the people and of training the masses in the spirit 
of the high ideals of industriousness, equality, fraternity, inter-
nationalism, peace, revolutionary irreconcilability towards tyranny 
and oppression. Public opinion is a powerful educational weapon of 
people who are imbued with the moral qualities laid down in the ethical 
code of the builders of communism. Ideology is also necessary in 
organizing the masses to liberate themselves from the fetters of 
capital ism.5 Not only is Lenin responsible for casting Marxist ideas 
into the role of ideology but also for giving Marxism its totalistic 
framework and made these ideas synonymous with total belief. Lenin 
had argued that "since there can be no talk of an independent ideology 
being developed by the masses of the workers themselves in the process 
of their movement, the only choice is: either the bourgeois or the 
socialist ideology."6 Nevertheless he insisted that Marxism is guided 
by science and he maintained that Marxism was replacing politics by a 
strikingly integral and harmonious scientific theory which would emanci-
pate the world from spiritual enslavement. People would be equipped 
with a scientific method of cognition which they would apply in 
explaining social life. 
5. V. I. Lenin. Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 375. 
6. Daniel Bell. "Ideology and Soviet Politics". Slavic Review. 
XXIV, No. 4,(December 1965), p..593. 
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Other writers have depicted ideology as a deformed and inverted 
reflection of the real. They have conceived of ideology as being an 
illusion that ignores its own material foundations. This, of course, 
leads to a very restricted definition of ideology. The boundaries of 
ideology are constituted by what it is not: knowledge, "true conscious-
ness". This position was adopted by Lukacs in his History and Class 
Consciousness. Lukacs has defined ideology as a "false consciousness". 
The element of falsity derives from the partiality of ideology. Ideo-
logy is unable to seize the "total meaning" of society and history. 
He contrasts ideology with "true consciousness". The bearer of this 
true consciousness is the proletariat. Only the proletariat has the 
ability to escape ideology and know the whole truth.7 It is the pre-
rogative of the militant proletariat to use ideological analysis to 
unmask the hidden motives of its adversaries. Unfortunately, however, 
this potential capacity to transcend "false consciousness", or ideology, 
is not actualized in proletarians as such, but only in party intellec-
tuals such as Lukacs. As he has admitted, one must never ignore the 
distance which separates the level of consciousness of even the most 
revolutionary workers, and the true class consciousness of the pro-
letariat.8 Here Lukacs implicitly identifies himself as one of the 
bearers of "true class consciousness of the proletariat" and a member 
of that group which has access to the truth. 
7. George Lukacs. History and Class Consciousness. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1968. Translated by R. Livington, p. 71. 
8. Ibid,, p. "75. 
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The proletariat, according to Lukacs, possesses the know-
ledge of the total socio-economic process. The imminent victory of 
the proletariat will supposedly abolish all particular standpoints. 
Lukacs' position here contrasts with Lenin's espousal of science, for 
to identify "false consciousness" with all partial or restricted out-
looks is to cast doubt on the specialization that any science necessarily 
implies. Scientific information can only be disseminated by the upper 
classes who are not part of the proletariat and, secondly, it can only 
confuse the proletariat whose role it is to create the Marxist 
revolution. 
Marcuse joins forces with Lukacs and criticizes the appli-
cation of science in freeing men from the "fetters" of ideology. 
According to Marcuse, science cannot function as the basis of a critique 
of the prevailing state of affairs. The form and content of scientific 
concepts remain bound up with the prevailing order of things; they are 
static in character.9 Philosophical cognition is superior to experience 
and science. The rationality of science, instead of being used for the 
attainment of a rational order of life, creates those conditions which 
mask irrationality. He states: 
The pr inc ip les of modern science were a 
p r i o r i structured in such a way that they could 
serve as conceptual instruments for a universe 
of se l f - p rope l l i ng , productive c o n t r o l ; 
9. Herbert Marcuse. Reason and Revolution. Boston: Beacon Press 
1960, p. 157. 
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theoretical operational ism. The 
scientific method which led to the 
ever-more-effective domination of 
nature thus came to provide the 
pure concepts as well as the 
instrumentalities for the ever-
more-effective domination of man by 
man through the domination of nature JO 
The interpretation of ideology as a mere reflection of the 
economic infrastructure was accepted also by Bernstein. Ideology, 
according to Bernstein, is reduced to an epiphenomenon, a mechanical 
reflection of the movement of the economic base. He accepts the 
Marxist thesis that the method of production of the material things 
of life settles generally the social, political, and spiritual pro-
cess of life.n Although Bernstein believed that man had a moral will 
which enabled him to ease class antagonisms, which is a non-determin-
istic view, he believed that ideology obediently follows the fatal-
istic unfolding of history without itself possessing any force. 
Ideologies, for Bernstein, neither implied social progress nor did 
they contribute to the maintenance of social stagnation. Development 
is accomplished without or against the will of man. 
Marxists do not have the intellectual monopoly over the term 
"ideology". Ideology has been associated with the sociology of know-
10. Herbert Marcuse. Reason and Revolution, op. cit., p. 185. 
11. Eduard Bernstein. Evolutionary Socialism. New York: Schocken 
Books, 1970, p. 7. 
12. Ibid,., p. 15. 
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ledge and has received close attention from Karl Mannheim. Mannheim 
labelled as ideology the conservative, interest-based and biased ideas 
of the dominant class in society. It is a self-serving set of ideas 
designed to promote the interests of the advantaged.13 This -js the 
particular ideology which is a reflection of the special interests of 
competitive groups in society. From this particular ideology develops 
a total ideology or sociology of knowledge, "an all inclusive principle 
according to which the thought of e^ery group is seen arising out of 
its life condition".'4 There will be a time when society would be 
ruled by an intellectual elite trained in the sociology of knowledge 
which would be capable of transcending the bias of particular ideologies. 
This elite is a "socially unattached intelligentsia" which operates 
critically because it is not firmly situated in the social order J 5 in 
a way Mannheim adopts Lukacs1 concept of the proletariat as being 
capable of knowing the truth thus leading the discussion of ideology 
back to de Tracy's original concept. The main goal of the sociology of 
knowledge is to show objectively how the social setting decisively 
controls the content and purpose of thinking, to unmask and lay bare the 
unconscious sources of intellectual existence and the unconscious motives 
that lead men to adopt particular viewpoints. According to Mannheim, 
modes of thought cannot be properly understood outside of their social 
13. Karl Mannheim. Ideology and Utopia. New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and World, Inc., 1968, p. 49. 
14. Ibid., pp. 55-56. 
15. Ibid.', p. 137. 
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context. "The powers of perception of the different perspectives 
are conditioned by the social situations in which they arose and to 
which they are relevant."^ Thought is conditioned by the life 
situation of the thinker and his group. The individual becomes bound 
into a system of relationships, which hamper his will and rest upon his 
uncontrolled decisions. He becomes free to choose only when he is 
made aware of the motives hidden behind his decisions. The task of 
discovering these motives belongs to those intellectuals who are 
trained in the sociology of knowledge. 
When sciences, such as mathematics and physics, reach certain 
conclusions, these conclusions have validity only for the groups of 
people who are similary situated, who see things from the same perspective. 
The individualistic assumption of classical epistemology receives a 
harsh criticism from Mannheim. He maintains that the perspective from 
which men's ideas are formed is the product of social circumstance. 
Social circumstances form men's ideas and not the reverse. But this 
view of Mannheim creates a serious problem: what is the status of 
this sociological theory that claims all such theory is relative? This 
difficulty has come to be known as Mannheim's paradox. Mannheim here 
attempts to save his theory by insisting that just because a mode of 
thought is socially determined, it is not to be discarded and condemned 
as false. This provides Mannheim with some flexibility but his theory 
must be elaborated further. Thus, like Lukacs, he attempts to locate 
16. Karl Mannheim. Ideology and Utopia, op. cit., p. 255. 
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a particular social group that is prone to the truth because of its 
life style. For Lukacs, as we have seen, such a group was the pro-
letariat. For Mannheim it is the intellegentsia. As we saw, this 
social group has the ability and hence the chance to perceive the 
truth because it is "unattached" and is best suited to rise above the 
distorted perceptions and see the reality. 
Mannheim's paradox, however, remains unresolved. The 
unresolved paradox renders his descriptions and theories immune to 
empirical evaluation. Since his hypotheses are untestable in principle, 
they are useless for scientific analysis and research. But even if 
we did not insist on strict adherence to scientific methods, we 
could still argue that it is yery debatable whether any social group 
is free of partiality and unattached. Even here Mannheim is not con-
sistent though he strives for clarity of definition as he distinguishes 
between two uses of the term. He calls them the particular conception 
of ideology and the total conception of ideology. The particular con-
ception of ideology reflects the special interests of eclectic, com-
petitive groups in a society, and a structure of values that expresses 
the felt needs of the groups. Thus, in the particular conception, 
ideology is used simply as a negative evaluation. An opponent's argu-
ments are dismissed as lies and deceptions. The particular conception 
of ideology remains on the psychological level. With the total con-
ception of ideology Mannheim becomes concerned with world outlooks, 
with the belief systems of an age of of an historical, social group. 
Unfortunately it is not always clear whether Mannheim is using the term 
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in its particular or total application. He states that the "particular 
conception of ideology signifies a phenomenon intermediate between a 
simple lie at one pole, and an error, which is the result of distorted 
and faulty conceptual apparatus, at the other. It refers to the sphere 
of errors, psychological in nature, which, unlike deliberate deceptions, 
are not intentional, but follow inevitably and unwittingly from certain 
determinants."17 The total conception of ideology is obtained when 
men surrender the static conception of consciousness. Now "the growing 
body of material discovered by historical research does not remain an 
incoherent and discontinuous mass of discrete events. This conception 
of consciousness provides a more adequate perspective for the compre-
hension of historical rea1ity."18 More importantly, Mannheim is 
capable of using the term in senses that are not exactly reducible to 
either the particular or total conceptions. For example, at times 
ideology means conservative as contrasted with Utopian thinking.^ 
Mannheim's theory of total ideology suffers from many deficiencies 
as a tool of analysis. His theory is so sweeping and so radically 
relativistic that, despite his efforts to find a way out,20 he is un-
able to do justice to the multitude of economic, social, and psycho-
logical forces that mediate between society and its values and modes of 
knowledge. 
17. Karl Mannheim. Ideology and Utopia, op. cit., p. 61. 
18. Ibid., p. 63. 
19. Ibid., p. 102. 
20. Robert K. Merton. Social Theory and Social Structure. 
New York: The Free Press, 1968 
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Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia has failed to inaugurate a 
series of theories. It has been followed by the deterioration of 
analysis of ideology and by a tendency of writers in this area to 
pursue divergent courses. 
In modern American theory, the term ideology has normally been 
associated with consciously formulated, political outlooks. Within 
this general perspective there has also been a great variation in the 
definition of the concept. Shils associates ideology with rapid, 
fanatical, closed systems which are typified by communism and fascism. 
For Shils, ideology is the "creation of charismatic persons who 
possess powerful, expensive, and simplified visions of the world."21 
Ideologies are always opposed to the status quo, even where their 
advocates happen to be in power. The New Left in America depicts 
ideology as the cunning construct of the big conglomerates and their 
political lieutenants. 
According to Daniel Bell, ideologies are forms of legitimation. 
Society has to justify itself in one way or another to its members. It 
has to establish some justification of the coercion; it has to trans-
form power into legitimacy in order to govern without turning an entire 
society into a concentration camp.22 if
 0ne of the functions of ideo-
logies were this, the leaders of the Soviet Union and other societies 
would not have to resort to brute force to remain in power. 
Bell further asserts that ideology is an instrument for 
rationalization. It also serves as a mechanism for the internalization 
21. Edward Shils. "Ideology & Civility: On the Politics of the 
Intellectuals." Sewanee Review. LXCI (July-September 1958), p. 450. 
22. Daniel Bell. "Ideology and Soviet Politics." Slavic Review 
XXIV, No. 4 (December 1965), p.. 593. "". 
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of values, beliefs and purposes. "Within eyery operative society 
there must be some creed, a set of beliefs and values, traditions and 
purposes which links both the institutional networks and the emotional 
affinities of the members into some transcendental whole and there have 
to be some mechanisms whereby those values cannot only be internalized 
by individuals...but also made explicit for the society...."23 if 
ideologies performed such functions, ideally, each member of the Soviet 
society would subscribe to this belief system and would have internal-
ized the goals and values that derive from communist ideology. Each 
person would have accepted the decisions of the party and the role of 
the communist party in society, and would display an eagerness to 
become a highly productive member of society. Yet this is not the case. 
In his study of ideology and totalitarianism Brzezinski uses 
the following as a working definition of ideology: 
It is essentially an action programme suitable 
for mass consumption, derived from certain 
doctrinal assumptions about the general nature 
of the dynamics of social reality, and combining 
some assertions about the inadequacies of the 
past and/or present with some explicit guides 
to action for improving the situation and some 
notions of the desired eventual state of affairs. 
Ideology thus combines political action with a 
consciousness both of purpose and of the general 
thrust of hi story.24 
23. Daniel Bell. Ideology and Soviet Politics, op. cit., 
pp. 591 - 603. 
24. Zbigniew Brzezinski. Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics. 
New York: Praeger, 1967 , p. 5. 
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While these formulations are generally sophisticated, they reflect 
some of the conceptual confusion in the study of ideology and under-
play the crucial role of theories of reality and the interplay of 
such theories with social structures and value systems. 
Geertz has argued for a more neutral conception of ideology, 
neutral as to its particular, political complection as well as to its 
veracity. According to Geertz, ideology can be seen as one of the 
forms of cultural patterns which provide practical orientations and 
enable individuals to give some coherence to their social circum-
stances. Ideologies tend to be schematic. However, because they 
perform a practical function, the schematization does not necessarily 
lead to distortion. Thus the defining characteristic of ideology is 
function and not distortion.^ 
Another definition according to which ideology is seen in a 
neutral manner and one which gives ideology great scope and utility 
is provided by Macpherson. He says: 
I use ideology in a neutral sense, neither 
implying, with Marx, an idealistic philos-
ophy and "false consciousness", nor with 
Mannheim, contrasting ideology and 'utopia1. 
I take ideology to be any more or less 
systematic set of ideas about man's place in 
nature, in society, and in history (i.e. in 
relation to particular societies), which can 
elicit the commitment of significant numbers 
of people to (or against) political change. 
This does not exclude a set of ideas 
essentially concerned with merely a class or 
25. Clifford Geertz. "Ideology as a Cultural System," in 
Ideology and Discontent. Ed. by David Apter, New York: The 
Free Press, 1964 ,
 pp. 47-76. 
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nations, if it relates the place and needs 
of that section of humanity to the place of 
man in general Ideologies contain in 
varying proportions, elements of explanation 
(of fact and of history), justification (of 
demands), and faith and belief (in the 
ultimate truth or rightness of their case). 
They are informed by, but are less precise 
and systematic than, political theories or 
political philosophies.26 
Ideologies, according to the above quotation, not only do not have 
sweeping visions but also seek to answer the questions regarded as 
important for the society to which they appeal, the society which 
they must seek to transform or maintain. Moreover, Macpherson suggests, 
they do not make universal statements about human life but are kept 
fairly close within the bounds of human possibilities. 
Furthermore, we should realize that an ideology is not to be 
taken to mean irrationality or intellectual dishonesty. As has been 
pointed out, "we have to face the fact that ideas, whether they may at 
times serve as part of myths, are independently subject to the standard 
of truth."27 The major function of ideology is to produce fusion of 
thought and action, not to infuse ideas with passion which blinds men 
from understanding their own limitations. Ideology does not attempt to 
hinder the rational abilities of man but it attempts to place passion 
under the control of reason, to apply intelligence, the fusion of passion 
26. C. B. Macpherson. Democratic Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1973, pp. 157-158. 
27. Carl J. Friedrich. "Political Philosophy," in Approaches to the 
Study of Politics. Ed. by R. Young, Northwestern University Press, 
p. 186. 
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and critical reason, to the problems of the modern world. We have to 
make a distinction also between ideology defined as a system of ideas 
concerning the existing social order together with actions to be 
taken regarding it, and a revolutionary or totalitarian ideology defined 
as the total rejection of the existing society and programmes of total 
reconstruction. As Aiken remarks, "the general idea that concerns us is 
not...the identification of ideology with revolutionary activity, 
especially of the more bizarre and feckless sort,"28
 an ideology which 
in its vision of the future cannot distinguish possibilities from 
probabilities, but the issues over which men in societies will continue 
to quarrel. 
I propose to define ideology as any more or less systematic 
set of ideas and thoughts which have been converted into beliefs 
explaining man's attitudes towards life and his existence in society 
and specifying a pattern of political action responsive to, and commensur-
ate with, such ideas and thoughts. Political ideologies are mainly 
concerned with the distribution of political power; they are concerned 
with the more equitable distribution of resources among the various 
classes constituting the society. 
FUNCTIONS OF IDEOLOGY 
Ideologies are employed to facilitate or even achieve the 
transitoriness from those arrangements in which unthinking acceptance of 
poverty, prejudice, superstition, unquestioning submission to authority, 
28. David Aiken. "The Revolt Against Ideology." Commentary 37 (April 1964), 
p; 38. - " :. ' 
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irrational in themselves, are permanent features of society.29 
An ideology is a uniting and persuasive force. It functions 
as integrating values around which individuals or societies become 
organized and exist as coherent entities. 
An ideology is an activating instrument. It enables people 
to put ideas into application. Ideas require the persuasive qualities 
of ideologies; otherwise ideas would remain meaningless abstractions. 
Ideology is the major dynamic force in history. For a dynamic factor, 
however, to have historical significance it must meet certain pre-
requisites. Only rational ideas can have historic effects and only to 
the extent to which they correspond to the empirical trends of events. 
More precisely, the role of ideology is to give the forces of history 
rational, communicable form so that they may become effective and not 
to be dissipated in a series of short-lived explosions. The condition 
for the permanent effectiveness of an ideology is the validity of the 
ideas. To be valid, an ideology must read correctly its social and 
natural environment, must be cognizant of its direction, and must be 
applied in action. Its aims and goals are to conquer the irrational 
forces. Another requirement for its success is to reformulate its aims 
with each passing wind. An ideology restrains, stimulates and guides 
action by its intellectual force and it carries ideas beyond the age 
and the social circles in which it expressed a living experience. 
An ideology operates in a dialectical manner, as a process 
in which contrary and defective truths are harmonized. The synthesis 
29. George Lichtheim. The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays. 
New York: Vintage Books, 1967, p. 45. 
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of thesis and antithesis results in a more complete truth. Societies 
reach a point where the prevailing outlook and ideas are inadequate 
to explain things and to justify the condition of people or guide their 
conduct and thus the prevailing outlook has become unacceptable. 
Ideologies, then, will seek to redefine man's perspective regarding the 
place of man in society. 
Ideologies in the past were the conspicuous vehicles for 
change. As Hoffer remarks, "Islam,when it emerged,was an organizing 
and modernizing medium. Christianity was a civilizing and modernizing 
influence among the savage tribes of Europe. The Crusaders and the 
Reformation both were crucial factors in shaking the Western world from 
Of) 
the stagnation of the Middle Ages."° Again the phenomenal moderniz-
ation of Japan "would probably not have been possible without the 
revivalist spirit of Japanese national ism."31 Lenin and the Bolsheviks 
plunged recklessly into chaos in their attempt to create a new world 
because they had a blind faith in the omnipotence of Marxist doctrine. 
If hope and faith are not backed by reason, the ideology will generate 
the most reckless daring. This type of ideology has a millenial component. 
CONCLUSION 
Ideology, at least in its philosophical sense, appeared as a 
radicalization of the early modern critique of medieval philosophy, 
natural and political. It was an attempt to reconstitute the sciences 
on the basis of a new theoretical understanding of the human mind. Soon 
30. Eric Hoffer. The True Believer. New York: Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1951, p. 4. 
31. Ibid., p. 5. 
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it became more concerned with social and political criticism. How-
ever, as soon as ideology made its appearance, a strong reaction, 
political in nature, occurred. Subsequent ideologies came to consider 
every opposing or any previous "ideologies" (or opposing "scientific" 
facts) as false "ideologies". Gradually it came to be regarded as 
empirical sociology or a science by those who criticized other ideas. 
This empirical sociology in turn was called an ideology by its 
opponents. Marxism, like all "scientific" theories designed for social 
action, is itself an ideology par excellence. The problem with Marxism 
is that it makes absolute claims and pretends to know the ultimate truth. 
But the charge of being ideological is not a label of which the Marxists 
could retain possession; it is being used against all and sundry, including 
the followers of Marx themselves. 
The treatment of ideology by the exponents of the decline-of-
ideology thesis has a number of striking parallels with the treatment 
Marx has provided. One of these parallels is that they regard Marxism 
as the prime example of ideology just as Marx regarded capitalism. 
The term ideology has come to mean something shady, a kind of 
falsity. Also the manner in which the term has been used suggests that 
each historical stage has less falsity. But only the last historical stage 
which, for Lukacs and Marx is the arrival of communism, is free of 
ideologies. When we reach a particular historical stage or some particular 
political arrangements, we transcend ideology. Ideology ceases to per-
form its function, which is the unmasking of its opponents' lies, since 
the reasons for its existence have disappeared. Here we find another 
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important parallel. According to the exponents of the decline of 
ideology, we reach the point where ideologies serve no purpose when 
the politics of Social Democracy have triumphed. Thus, instead of 
providing a conceptual analysis of ideology, the exponents of the 
decline thesis cast themselves into the role of the ideologue. This 
contention will be elaborated later. 
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THE DECLINE OF IDEOLOGY: 
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 
The decline of ideology has been assigned several meanings. 
Each of the authors who has taken the position that ideologies have 
ended has seen the disappearance of certain characteristics of ideo-
logy as constituting evidence that ideology itself is declining or 
has declined. They have argued that radical ideologies have lost 
their relevance. Some see the coalescence of certain issues of 
traditionally antagonistic ideologies as constituting evidence that 
ideologies are losing their power to motivate. 
Aron has emphasized that the passing of fanaticism in 
political belief has eroded ideologies that were at one time sharp, 
distinct and explicit J He asserts that ideological controversy is 
dying down because divergent demands today can be reconciled.2 
The impetus to the decline of ideology thesis was provided by 
the Milan conference on "The Future of Freedom", sponsored by the 
Congress of Cultural Freedom in September, 1955. The intellectuals who 
attended the conference reached a consensus along the following lines: 
rhetoric has been replaced by reason and ideologies have lost their 
religious fervour; total or extremist ideologies have disappeared; 
passion has replaced practical analysis; objective criteria in the 
1. Raymond Aron. The Opium of the Intellectuals. New York: 
W. W. Norton & Co., 1962. 
2. Raymond Aron. "Nations and Ideologies." Encounter*. IV:. 1 (January 
1955), p., 32. 
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evaluation of goals and aims have replaced distortion; and Bolshevism 
and other fanatical movements have disappeared. They argued that 
radical movements of the past have ceased to exist in the West and 
that perverted Marxism, which has provided the basis for certain ideo-
logical movements, has been abandoned. The important factor in the J)V^ 
decline of ideology for these intellectuals is the abandonment of &/ 
revolutionary alternative. Adjustments or reforms, the adherence to 
democratic values, conservatism and liberalism entered into the dis-
cussion only peripherally. 
It is therefore pertinent to ask whether these writers may not 
have confused the presumed demise of Marxist ideology with the demise 
of ideology as a whole. To ask this question suggests that we ought 
to inquire into what they meant by ideology and the end of ideology. 
Certainly the exhaustion of Marxism and Marxist ideas cannot substantiate 
the decline-of-ideology thesis. As long as there is commitment to 
democratic values, commitment to conservatism, liberalism or socialist 
ideas or other ideologies, it is meaningless to speak of the end of 
ideology. 
For Seymour Lipset, liberal and socialist politics can no longer 
serve as the arena for serious criticism from the left. The critical 
works of intellectuals, he claims, are sociological rather than politi-
3 
cal. Ideological politics can only exist in the underdeveloped countries 
where the leader must find a scapegoat to blame for the ills of the 
society if he is not to lose his hold on the masses "who need the hope 
3. Seymour M. Lipset. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. 
New York: Doubleday, 1960, p. 407. 
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implicit in revolutionary chiliastic doctrine-a hope the Communists 
are ready to supply."4 He admits, then, that ideological politics 
are characterized by the attribution of absolute value to any pro-
gramme, means of action, by a tendency to act radically without regard 
to circumstances. 
Daniel Bell claims that ideologies are exhausted because 
ideologies have lost their truth and their power to persuade. He states: 
Few serious minds believe any longer that 
one can set down 'blueprints' and through 
'social engineering' bring about a new 
Utopia of social harmony. At the same 
time, the older 'counterbeliefs' have lost 
their intellectual force as well. Few 
'classic' liberals insist that the State 
should play no role in the economy, and 
few serious conservatives...believe that the 
Welfare State is the road to serfdom. In 
the Western world, therefore, there is today 
a rough consensus among intellectuals on 
political issues: the acceptance of the 
Welfare State: the desirability of de-
centralized power; a system of mixed 
economy and of political pluralism. In 
that sense, too, the ideological age has 
ended.5 
But let us examine the argument that ideology has declined. How does 
Bell define the liberal and the conservative? Classic liberalism and 
conservatism hardly met all the requirements of the definition of 
ideology. Secondly, non-ideological politics, according to Bell, exist 
4. Ibid., p. 415. 
5. Daniel Bell. "The End of Ideology." in Power, Participation and 
Ideology. Ed. by C. J. Larsen and P. C. Wasburn, New York: David McKay 
Co., 1964, p. 455. 
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within the framework of a political society that has rejected, 
intellectually speaking, the old apocalyptic and chiliastic visions. 
Thirdly, ideological belief is the commitment to the "isms" of 
traditional thought which fails to take into consideration the 
evolution these "isms" have undergone. Thus he concludes that if a 
society is not committed to these traditional ideas, issues cannot be 
formulated any more in ideological terms. Or, to put it in different 
terms, issues are not seen through ideological prisms. This, however, 
should be dismissed as unacceptable. Fourth, Bell underestimates the 
strength of classical liberalism and conservatism in the United States. 
If Bell had gone to the trouble to look a little further, he would have 
recognized the simple fact that the American Constitution is a con-
servative document very fearful of surrendering traditionalist parochial 
values rather than ensuring progressive values. He would have seen 
also that socialism is strongly opposed by both liberals and conserva-
tives because it is seen as a serious threat to their interests. This 
is attested by the fact that the social measures which have been insti-
tuted by the government do not constitute any comprehensive social 
policy. He would have seen that communism appears as an evil to the 
Americans because it remains an expanding totalitarian imperialism. 
Bell goes on to say that if the end of ideology has any meaning, 
it is to ask for the end of rhetoric and rhetoricians.6 However, the 
6. Daniel Bell. The End of Ideology, op. cit., p. 462. 
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use of such arguments to support the claim that ideologies have ended 
is naive when there are people who are making serious indictments con-
cerning the stupidity, brutality, and inhumanity of the affluent classes 
and the influence they exert on governments. It is meaningless to 
speak of the end of debate and rhetoric when there is a demeaning world 
the affluent classes have forced upon the poor amid hollow proclamations 
of a just society. Those who take such a position ignore the fact that 
there are serious criticisms and questioning by the public and intellec-
tuals which makes Bell's argument that rhetoric has ended and therefore 
ideology has ended a naive claim. Such an argument would imply: 
a conception of human relations which 
would deprive us of the right to address 
one another except for the purpose of 
comparing notes about matters of fact. 
Consider what would happen were such 
fantasy to come true. In any ordinary 
sense, it would mean a virtual end to 
discourse, to communication, and to 
argument Indeed, the image of man 
implicit in Bell's dream of the end of 
ideology is precisely one of academic 
grind or functionary to which he himself, 
as a counter-ideologist and counter-
rhetorician is unfortunately unable to 
conform.7 
Perhaps we do not have to reach the point where we address each 
other for the purpose of comparing notes about matters of fact in order 
for us to claim that ideologies have ended, but we do at least require 
the existence of a society in which social problems have been solved to 
7. David Aitken. "The Revolt Against Ideology." Commentary, 37:4 
(April- 1964), p." 43. 
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the general satisfaction, moral issues do not exist and a consensus 
has been reached on the goals to be pursued. However, the fact remains 
that politics is still \/ery much concerned with the justification of 
political action and organization because of strong criticism. There 
are issues that trouble the public and we live in societies which 
require an image of a world better than the one in which we live, a 
world which will be better not by material abundance, but by an improve-
ment of the quality of life, by being more just, free and equal. 
Apparently Bell believes that the end of rhetoric and rhetoricians 
has come about because, as he believes, the debate between left and 
right is dead.8 In other words, according to Bell, left and right 
reflect the scale by which we evaluate debate and rhetoric and there-
fore ideological thinking. Here it is also assumed that political 
direction by which we attempt to solve social problems is ordered along 
the left-right continuum and since, according to Bell, the ideological 
positions of the left and right are converging, ideological thinking 
declines. 
Another inference that is contained in what Bell says is that 
socialism is replacing the "inadequacies" of the capitalist system, 
that socialism will bring a more equitable distribution of goods, and 
under it everything will be established on the basis of reflection and 
rational reconstruction and decisions will be subject to scientific 
8. Daniel Bell. The End of Ideology, op. cit., p. 460. 
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criteria. Twentieth century history compels us to ask whether the 
socialist system is capable of removing injustices and the causes of 
conflict, and whether it will be able to replace the "irrationalities" 
of the capitalist system. The record of socialism deserves just as 
careful a scrutiny as does capitalism. What Bell says sounds like a 
reassertion of the Utopian vision of the heavenly kingdom on earth. 
Bell is engaged in the most profound ideological thinking. 
Another argument that Daniel Bell advances in support of his 
claim that ideologies have ended is that the left is no longer pre-
occupied with the attainment of the Utopian society. It has abandoned 
its rigid dogmatism and is more interested in progressive reforms. 
However, the left covers a myriad of overlapping forms of socialism and 
it all depends on which of the main varieties of socialism we speak. 
Marxism-Leninism still remains a secular religion, preaching the necessity 
of class warfare, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the concentra-
tion of all power in a tightly structured party that is supposedly the 
vanguard of the revolutionary masses. It is dogmatic in its determina-
tion to abolish private property and nationalize the means of production, 
it has an ultimate goal-the classless society-and today it has no fewer 
adherents than it ever had before. Social Democracy is the most liberal 
version of socialism. It has accepted a multiparty political system and 
believes in gradual peaceful means of reaching its socialist goals. It 
has been more concerned with alleviating what it regards as hardships 
created by capitalist economies than with directly restructuring societies 
according to a blueprint and its tenets are the same as they were a century 
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ago. It is highly critical of Marxism and has attacked the theory 
of economic determinism, arguing that ideas and values are independent 
of economic conditions, and are themselves important causal agencies in 
determining economic evolution. 
Secondly, ideologies do not have to be rigid. They may well 
have an elastic quality to cover very different social groups, to unite 
them within a common terminology. For any ideology to survive, it must 
be sufficiently flexible to allow this kind of multiple interpretation 
otherwise it will be simply an historic occurrence. It will be a 
short-lived phenomenon. Ideologies must allow for adaptability to new 
circumstances. They must be prepared to abandon old notions and accept 
new ones and must not claim to supply all the answers to all questions. 
An ideology must not claim to have the exclusive solution of man's 
socio-political problems or to refuse to admit the validity of other 
competitive ideological solutions. Thus, if the left has modified its 
position, it is coming closer to meeting the criteria of an ideology, 
rather than disappearing as an ideology. 
THE CONVERGENCE THEORY AND THE THESIS THAT THE 
END-OF-IDEOLOGY THESIS IS ITSELF AN IDEOLOGY 
At this point we come to the question whether the end-of-
ideology thesis is itself part of an ideology which makes the phenomenon 
self-refuting. The ideological character of the thesis is clearly 
apparent in Lipset's, Bell's and Mannheim's arguments. The key notions 
which carry ideological weight are those of the convergence of the two 
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great ideological systems, as already has been seen. It is this 
convergence which leads to the emergence of a new social order: 
Social Democracy. Most of these writers appear to hail the arrival 
of the mixed economy allegedly guided by Keynesian theories. Whether 
Keynesian theories are themselves true is \/ery debatable. Some of 
the writers seem to attach to Social Democracy a messianic value. 
Social Democracy will cure the evils of society and will remove the 
cause of conflict and inequalities. Bell is quite clear as an advo-
cate of Social Democracy and he believes in the "necessity of constant, 
incessant pressure from the left upon the establishment and the status 
quo in order to rectify grave social wrongs: injustices, inequalities 
and other miseries that are removable through collective social action."" 
In any case the convergence of the two economic systems, it is assumed, 
leads to the convergence of the two ideologies which leads to a lessening 
of conflict and consequently to the decline of ideology. 
The first writer to predict the arrival of Social Democracy 
was Keynes. He believed that the arrival of Social Democracy was in-
evitable and that social justice could be promoted through Social 
Democratic institutions. Keynes believed that "the battle of Socialism 
against unlimited private profit is being won in detail hour by hour."10 
9. Daniel Bell. "Ideology-A Debate." Commentary, 38:4 {October 1964), 
p. 72. ' ' " • -
10. M. John Keynes. The End of Laissez-faire. Dubuque, Iowa: 
W. C. Brown, 1926. p. 14. 
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Economic progress could be achieved through collective action and 
consequently through collective politics. Experience, he argued, 
shows that individuals, when they make up a social unity, are always 
less clear-sighted than when they act collectively. Therefore, 
several economic matters should not be left to the chances of private 
judgment and private profits. 
The debate on whether or not the socio-economic systems of 
the East and the West are becoming more similar and may gradually con-
verge was quite vivid during the sixties. Especially was this true of 
those in the West who were impressed by the apparent drive for greater 
decentralization in the Soviet Union. The decline of ideology resulting 
from this convergence has been seen from different angles by the 
various participants in the debate, especially by Mannheim. 
For Mannheim, it appeared that the sober truth was at last 
being told because of fundamental changes in the superstructure and the 
base. As we have seen, Karl Mannheim defines ideology as beliefs which 
express the interests of a particular social group and as such it only 
provides a partial and distorted view of reality. However, he claims, 
there is the individual intellectual who is committed to the ideal of 
objective, disinterested, undistorted and independent knowledge. 
Mannheim sees the superstructure as being undermined. The political, 
juridical, religious and moral views, of which the superstructure con-
sists, are reflecting less and less the "distorted" ideas of the 
11. Ibid., p. 15. 
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bourgeoise system due to a change in the base: the mode of production. 
Thus, Mannheim sees the emergence of a group of intellectuals which is 
developing an objective and unbiased knowledge of man's social condition, 
one that rises above the distorted perspectives of the masses. This 
group of intellectuals is employed by private and public bureaucracies. 
These men are given freedom of thought and inquiry. 
Aside from his definition of ideology which should be dismissed 
as inaccurate, this concept suffers from some serious weaknesses. Why 
will these men not become the intellectual spokesmen for vested interests? 
Private bureaucracies represent vested interests and unless these 
intellectuals reflect the ideas and support the interests of these 
bureaucracies they will not be employed by them. Even if they do not 
reflect their ideas at first, eventually they will be transformed into 
administrators and will be subordinated to the bureaucracies that employ 
them. Even if they are employed by public bureaucracies, will they be 
allowed to follow the kind of direction they want? 
There is another implicit assumption here. Since Mannheim con-
siders as "emancipated" intellectuals those who come from the ranks of 
the left, it follows that the political myths of the left are gaining 
appeal, which, of course, is taking place at the expense of the right. 
Therefore, we cannot speak of converging ideological positions, as many 
theorists have argued, but of diminishing and increasing appeals. If 
this is the case, ideological positions will be hardened because the 
side that loses will perceive the other as a threat, thus dividing society 
into hostile and competing classes. 
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If there is a depoliticization of intellectuals, which is 
necessary if they are to rise above ideologies, it would be precisely 
the result of indoctrination and intensified manipulation by a group 
of ideologically sophisticated but cynical professional persuaders-
the kind of ideologists Daniel Bell has described. 
One cannot escape the temptation to argue that Mannheim is 
here echoing the thoughts of Compte, who believed that politics would 
become a sort of applied social physics and would rely on the spiritual 
guidance of the elite of social scientists.'2 Compte denied that there 
are forms of rational activity other than those which conform to the 
procedures of empirical science. The only standard of rationality is 
that of science, and his refusal to regard philosophy or metaphysics as 
domains of knowledge was based merely on the fact that their cognitive 
claims cannot be justified by scientific methods of inquiry. His "law" 
of the "three stages" of human intellectual development prescribes the 
direction which a progressively enlightened mankind ought to take. These 
stages are treated by Compte, just as Hegel did, as inescapable "moments" 
in the historical development of human thought. Just as Mannheim's 
intellectuals, Compte's theories are intended to transcend all earlier 
and lower forms of thought. 
The guidance of politics by an elite of social scientists was 
also the dream of Lester Ward who predicted the coming of a sociocratic 
12. Auguste Compte. Positive Philosophy. Translated by Harriet 
Martineau, London: Trubner & Co., 1853. 
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world in which the primacy of knowledge over power would finally be 
achieved. In a similar manner Karl Mannheim movingly argues for the 
need of an elite of intellectuals to put their hands on the tiller of 
the state. He also sounds like the nineteenth-century men of the left 
who declared their allegiance to the rationalism of the Enlightenment, 
believing, as they did, in human progress through science. These men 
sought to provide the basis for a new scientifically oriented ideo-
logy which would replace altogether what remained of the outlook of 
medieval thought. What they aspired to was a completely humanistic 
culture, securely based on the foundation of modern science. 
The "end of ideology" theorists are also placing a great 
emphasis on the decline of political radicalism and the decline of 
Marxism. They seem to argue that it is radical ideologies that have 
declined. Edward Shi 1s is explicit. He says: "The yery heart which 
has sustained idological politics among intellectuals over the past 
century is gradually losing its strength. Marxism is decomposing."^ 
Unfortunately Marxism by no means has lost its appeal among intellectuals 
and the public. But even if Marxism were being deflated, politics by no 
means would be rendered non-ideological. The disappearance of radicalism 
and the deflation of doctrinaire Marxism cannot substantiate the thesis 
that ideologies have ended. On the contrary, politics become more 
ideological. Radicalism leaves little, if any, room, for debate and 
13. Edward Shils. "Ideology and Civility: On the Politics of the 
Intellectuals." Sewanee Review. LXCI""(July-September T958) , p. 453. 
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controversy. The end of radical ideological systems has resulted in a 
proliferation of sects that have intensified the ideological debate. As 
Raymond Aron remarks, on second thought, "Ideological discussions are 
incomparably richer now than during the cold war, when we had apologias 
for the democratic-Keynesian-liberal synthesis. Today the very founda-
tions of contemporary society are subject to debate."^ 
The writers to be discussed below see the decline of ideology 
mainly as the result of the alleged similarities which can be observed 
in the two political systems. But what are these similarities? How 
are the two systems converging? These writers have suggested that the 
degree of government intervention into a capitalist economy and the 
abandonment of demands by the left for total nationalization of the means 
of production can be used to measure the trend toward convergence and 
they claim that the trend is strong. However, the convergence thesis, as 
will be seen, disregards more fundamental differences among social 
institutions and attitudes. 
Daniel Bell has stated that, "Today our entire society is 
committed to change, and in a direction which was first pointed out by the 
Left."'5 In the East, communism no longer serves as the official ideology 
for intellectuals who have lost faith that its goals can ever be attained. 
In the West, faith in classical liberalism has waned and socialism today 
14. Raymond Aron. "On the Proper Uses of Ideology." in Culture and its 
Creators. Ed. by Joseph David and Terry Clark, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, p. 2. 
15. Daniel Bell. Ideology-A Debate, op" cit.'p.,72. 
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provides the perspective on modern history which emphasizes that the 
achievement of freedom and the defense of the individual constitute a 
permanent revolution; and it tells us that this revolution resists any 
final definition J 6 However, socialism in the United States is outside 
the bounds of political possibility. Socialism requires that the 
control and operation of the means of production, distribution, and 
exchange should be in the hands of society rather than in the hands of 
private individuals, groups, or corporations. Any attempt to bring 
about socialism in the United States would involve a very sharp disensus 
with the whole industrial-business-government establishment. The entire 
institutional set-up in the United States is from a practical stand-
point incompatible with socialism and precisely for this reason Lipset 
has declared that socialism in the United States is politically and 
ideologically deadJ? 
Galbraith considers the end of ideology as being the consequence 
of the convergence that supposedly is taking place gradually of the two 
economic systems but he sees this convergence from a different standpoint. 
He states: 
16. Daniel Bell. Ideology-A Debate.
 0p c^ t_ p> 3'8# 
17. David Aiken. 'Ideology-A Debate, op". cit.'.P- 33. 
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Industrial Societies have an economic 
system which, whatever its formal 
ideological billing, is in substantial 
part a planned economy. The initiative 
in deciding what is to be produced 
comes not from the sovereign consumer 
who, through the market, issues the 
instructions that bend the productive 
mechanism to his ultimate will. Rather 
it comes from the great producing 
organization which reaches forward to 
control the market....One of the con-
clusions that follow from this analysis 
is that there is a broad convergence 
between industrial systems. The impera-
tives of technology and organization, 
not the image of ideology, are what 
determines the shape of economic society. 
The alleged convergence of the two systems, according to 
Galbraith, results then from some similarities that he sees in economic 
planning. Galbraith, however, admits that the sense of political 
direction this system imparts is wrong. It confuses and distorts, so 
that man is directed into the very conflicts and pitfalls he wants to 
avoidJ9 If such is the case, the new order that emerges will accentuate 
social conflict and ideological controversies. Aside from the problems 
into which he runs in his efforts to support his thesis, his notions carry 
a considerable ideological weight. He advocates that socialism should 
be the guide in social thought and we should strive towards the achieve-
ment of this goal. But he advocates his own brand of socialism, a social-
18. J. K. Galbraith. The New Industrial State. New American Library, 
New York and Scarborough, Ontario, 1972, p. 60. 
19. Ibid., pp. 113-115. 
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ism under which power in public enterprise would not be exercised by 
parliament or by its directly responsible agent, as has been the case 
under democratic socialism, but a system with autonomous public corpora-
tions. 
An attempt to portray the two systems as converging is made also 
by Raymond Aron who maintains that "over the past thirty years the 
extreme 'right' and 'left' disclosed identities which were more 
impressive than their differences. British socialism has not resulted 
in tyranny and has materially weakened the ideologies of thorough-going 
socialism and thorough-going neo-liberalism."20 Aron's arguments seem 
to be rather a criticism of the Marxist ideology and of traditional 
conservatism. He more or less argues that Marxism has lost much of its 
appeal and only few believe that Marx's ideas can find practical appli-
cation. He also appears to be defending the status quo against two 
different kinds of critics. 
Aron believes that the Left has modified its position on many 
issues and has departed considerably from the Marxist line. It has come 
to believe, according to Aron, that the reduction of inequalities is the 
main objective and goal of the Left,21 whereas Marx believed that the 
improvement of the human condition under a capitalist system can only 
prolong its collapse. The intellectual debate now between Left and Right, 
Aron argues, revolves around issues such as the extent to which planning 
should take place and the kind of socialist measures to be instituted. 
Aron's emphasis is on the passing of fanaticism in political belief and 
20. Quoted by Edward Shi Is in "The End of Ideology?" Encounter, 
V:5 (November 1955), p. 53. 
21. Raymond Aron. The Industrial Society. New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1966, p. 45. 
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the erosion of ideologies which were at one time sharp, distinct, and 
explicit.^^ There is an increasing awareness that "the political 
categories of the last century-Left and Right, liberal and socialist, 
traditionalist and revolutionary-have lost their relevance."23 H-JS 
observations of the various societies, Western and non-Western, led 
him to believe that "in most Western and non-Western societies, 
ideological controversy is dying down because experience has shown that 
divergent demands can be reconciled."24 
Aron's predictions about ideological trends proved to be pre-
mature. The rise of the new left in Germany in the 1960s, the 
radicalization of students all over the world, widespread assassinations 
of political leaders, the sudden rise of Marxist, Maoist and Marxist-
Leninist parties, the civil war in Ireland and other events forced Aron 
to reconsider his ideas. 
The problem with the debate of the convergence of the two systems 
is that it has remained plagued by conceptual confusion. As has been 
pointed out, any convergence of ideologies is out of the question and 
any trend toward apparent convergence could at best refer to greater 
22. Raymond Aron. The Opium of the Intellectuals. New York: W. W. 
Norton and Co., 1962. 
23. Nations and Ideologies, op._cit.,'p. 24. 
24. Ibid., p. 25. 
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similarity on the level of institutional practices and techniques.d0 
Or, as another writer has commented: "It is conceivable that two 
initially divergent systems increasingly come to resemble each other, 
as common environmental problems force similar solutions on them 
In practice, however, such convergence of systems with highly distinct 
ideologies is not \iery likely.. .unless the two antithetical or 
distinct ideologies themselves converge or are watered down or 'dis-
missed', any lasting convergence of the respective economic systems 
themselves is not to be expected."26 in the West we can naturally 
expect considerable departure from the strictly capitalist system 
because interests of different classes have produced different ideol-
ogies-the two major variants being conservatism and liberalism-and 
therefore it is not impossible to regard any single ideology as the 
determinant of the system. But we are not to assume that a lasting 
deviation can be afforded from the optimal one since public opinion and 
the competition between systems would not permit it. 
We do . have to admit that the economic role of Western govern-
ments has been on the increase, but not in the direction of Soviet-type 
planning. In other words, the systems have been growing more similar in 
25. Alexander Gerschenkron. Continuity in History. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968,ch.3. 
26. Albert Hirschman. "Ideology as a System Determinant." in 
Comparison of Economic Systems. Ed. by Alexander Eckstein, 
Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1971, p. 115. 
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some respects and less similar in others. In both cases the systems 
keep undergoing substantial changes in their policies, even in the 
underlying assumptions, though not so readily in their phraseology. 
But this process does not mean in itself that they are getting closer 
to one another in fundamental respects. We may notice some similarities 
in specific patterns of income distribution but the basic difference in 
the disposition of capital incomes and gains persists. Also, if 
economic similarities had become more convincing than they actually 
have, the political, ideological and psychological barriers to anything 
resembling convergence would remain unchanged. Each system would remain 
committed to its institutions which would prevent any real trend toward 
a convergence of the two systems. 
0thers27 have emphasized the substitution of the orthodox 
Leninist-Stalinist thesis with the substitution of "peaceful co-existence" 
and "peaceful competition" and the abandonment of the Leninist thesis of 
the inevitability of war with capitalism. However, a weakening of political 
tensions proves very little with respect to a convergence of socio-
economic systems. Even an intensive long-range exchange of scientific and 
technological experiences with co-operation on specific projects could 
very well be possible between countries with divergent socio-economic 
systems. Certainly the constant emphasis by Eastern countries on the 
impossibility of ideological adjustment and compromise on fundamental 
principles, let alone convergence, is more than a straw in the wind. 
27. Robert C. Tucker. "The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements." 
American Political Science Review, 61 (June. 196"7), pp."343,-358. 
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The fact that the Soviet Union has adopted some kind and 
degree of economic planning in a less than absolutely centralized 
manner and the West has adopted some social policies, as well as the 
fact that the West approves of some government intervention and the 
nationalization of some industries, points to the ongoing trans-
formation of each system, rather than a growing similarity between 
them. It does not point to the convergence nor the arrival of Social 
Democracy. The whole issue here is obscured by a semantic and con-
ceptual inertia that forces us to classify systems as capitalist, 
socialist or social democratic. There is a pluralism of socio-
economic arrangements. There will continue to exist an endless and 
constantly changing variety of 'systems' with different socio-economic 
and attitudinai arrangements; British socialism will continue to differ 
considerably or rather fundamentally from Soviet socialism and British 
capitalism from American or French. Each country will represent a given 
set of arrangements but they will not converge. Swedish socialism will 
be different from African socialism and British socialism will differ 
from American socialism. In the Western countries we cannot even be 
certain that within each country the existing socio-economic arrange-
ments will remain permanent. It must be pointed out also that a con-
trolled economy is not identical with a mixed economy. 
However, even if democratic socialism has re-examined and revised 
some of its ideological premises and the West has adopted some social 
democratic policies, that is not sufficient to substantiate the claim 
that ideologies have disappeared or even that ideological conflict has 
abated. It matters little if the overriding aim of social democrats is 
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to adapt themselves to changing conditions or that they have revised 
their positions on nationalization. The social democrats have realized 
that no large-scale intervention of the government in the private sector 
can be advocated without losing adherents. They are unable to provide 
the ideological justification which would be accepted by the public. 
We cannot speak meaningfully of convergence as long as the Communist 
attitude, even in the age of the supposed detente, has been that no 
convergence between socialism and capitalism is possible.^ For the 
communist mind the only real way to terminate the existing pluralism of 
systems is the final victory of communism everywhere. 
When we speak of convergence of political orientations we must 
remember that "convergence is neither complete, nor stable, nor new. 
It bears witness to the pacification of some sectors of the ideological 
fronts and perhaps also their shortcomings, but not necessarily a general 
abatement of ideological fervor and commitment Rather ideologies which 
still differ in doctrinal postures and in the emphasis of priorities 
reflect sooner or later the spread among part of their leaders and among 
mass publics of genuine agreement about formerly disputed principles and 
29 policies." This kind of ideological agreement has been seen as the de-
ideologization of politics. Agreement on political alternatives and, in 
general, ideological agreement often is reached through national exigencies. 
For example, we have the case of England which was ruled for thirty-four 
28. Lloyd G. Reynolds. The Three Worlds of Economics. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1971. 
29. Martin Seliger. Ideology and Politics. London: George Allen 
and Unwin Limited, 1976 , pp. 239-240. 
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years by coalition governments which handled questions and issues 
such as the foundation of the Welfare State, the depression, total 
mobilization and other equally controversial issues, which can divide 
political parties. 
National exigencies have forced political parties in Italy to 
reach an agreement on certain ideological issues. The inability of 
the Christian Democrats to capture the majority of the votes has 
compelled them to seek co-operation with the socialists. In turn, 
the Christian Democrats were compelled to modify their position on 
several issues and the socialists, in order to share the power, put 
aside doctrinaire Marxism and modified their demands. 
It would be more realistic to talk more modestly about a co-
existence of democratic socialist ideologies and capitalism and about 
a truce between Marxism and Western ideologies. There is no evidence 
which points to the convergence of the two socio-economic systems that 
can enable one to speak meaningfully about the decline of ideologies. 
The end of ideology has, however, not been proclaimed only by 
intellectuals of the left but also by intellectuals of the right, some 
of whom are high government officials. Their motives for dismissing 
ideologies as a thing of the past are different from those which come 
from the ranks of the left. Much of what they consider as a decline in 
ideology, however, is simply ideology. They want the creation of a new 
ideology that advocates commitment to technology. They want the creation 
of a society ruled by high-level political administrators and bureau-
crats. 
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Today societies are highly committed to industrialization. 
In the industrial society, science and technological knowledge have 
high values. The industrial society is dedicated to hard work and a 
keen sense of individual responsibility for performance of assigned 
tasks and norms. Ideology, to a considerable extent, is the cement that 
will hold such a society together. But it is an ideology which states 
the new technology and defines the economic and social relations which 
are sought to be most compatible with its fullest development. "Since 
an ideology is at the center of this class, there must be 'highpriests' 
to interpret and apply this ideology to current development."30 y n e 
function of these "high priests" is to create a consensus, to make this 
consensus into a reasonably consistent body of ideas. They must formulate 
and restate the major values, premises, and consensus of a society. To 
achieve this consensus, one has to extol the dominant values of the society 
and to deprecate the opposing ideologies, ideologies which would prevent 
the attainment of the consensus. 
Government officials in the United States, for example, have gone 
a long way toward de-emphasizing the role of ideologies, ideologies which 
are opposed to the dominant American values. While they claim that ideol-
ogies have ceased to exert any influence in the policies of the government, 
they assert that the Administration is motivated by a "spiritual view of 
30. Clark Kerr et al. Industrialism and Industrial Man. London: 
Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 43. 
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man and the ethic that mankind is moving towards higher standards, 
towards God." In other words, Carter's diplomacy, says Brzezinski, is 
"non-ideological in thrust but based on certain philosophical values".31 
Brzezinski continues by saying that the alternative the United States 
offers to the concept of historical inevitability is one based on greater 
pluralism and an increasing fulfilment of global aspirations for human 
rights. Thus ideology for him is anything that is not consistent with the 
dominant American values, any belief system which is characterized by 
rigidity, dogmatism and fanaticism. This becomes more obvious if we 
read some of his definitions of ideology. An ideology, according to 
Brzezinski, "seeks to promote a particular system on the basis of rigid 
doctrine Ours is a philosophically rooted policy, based on fundamental 
notions about the nature of man, morality and justice, but it does not 
seek to promote specific systems."32 
The argument that these political thinkers are the exponents of 
a new ideology becomes more credible as we look at the views of other 
writers. They seem to express an ideology which advocates devotion to 
duty and responsibility for performance and an ethic which motivates 
individuals to espouse the ethical valuations toward work and accumulation. 
Spengler employs the term in the sense that ideology provides an all-
.31. Time Europe. September 5, 1977. 
32. Ibid. 
- 56 -
embracing picture of social reality, that it interprets the entire 
future development of mankind from a single view and has consequences 
in relation to the course of history. For the ideologue, history is 
predetermined and its aims and values emanate from fundamental theoret-
ical prerequisites. Ideology is a totality of dogmatic ideas cut from 
the living reality. The adherence to ideological principles prevents 
the individual from assessing correctly specific measures that are 
taken to correct social problems. Consequently, "Ideology...retards 
both economic development and political development."33 Thus, ideology 
is seen as an obstacle to the espousal of the values of hard work and 
accumulation. 
Schlesinger holds a similar view as he says: "By ideology I 
mean a body of systematic and rigid dogma by which people seek to under-
stand the world-and to preserve or transform it."34 Therefore, he 
asserts, programmes undertaken by governments to increase overall pro-
duction, to resolve problems of unemployment and, in general, the 
technological approach to the solution of problems, are more effective 
than policies guided by ideologies, if ideologies are to be understood 
in this manner. 
33. J. J. Spengler. "Theory, Ideology, Non-economic Values and 
Politico-Economic Development" in Tradition, Values and Socio-Economic 
Development. Ed. by R. Braibenti & J. J. Spengler, Durham, N.C.: 
Duke University Press, 1961 , P- 31. 
34. Time Europe. September, 1977, p. 8. 
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THE INFLUENCE OF THE "WESTERN" IDEOLOGIES 
If exponents of the decline of ideology thesis search for the 
kind of "ideological" thinking that takes a rigid and dogmatic approach 
to politics, one that has a doctrinaire perception of politics, they 
will be completely unable to demonstrate that ideologies have declined. 
There are the other values of ideology which revolve around such 
important norms as liberty, equality, humanity, freedom, democracy, etc. 
There are goals which individuals seek to promote but within the frame-
work of an open society. There are values and goals which are championed 
by ideologies that do not posit an ultimate value, a final goal, a 
Utopia. These are ideologies which do not insist on the realization of 
the ideal, which is contained in the sacred, and do not seek a total 
transformation of society. 
Geertz, who does not conceive of ideology as being radical, 
dogmatic, or revolutionary, writes that "we may wait as long for the 
'end of ideology' as the positivists have waited for the end of religion." 
But Geertz views ideology as one of the forms of cultural patterns which 
have provided practical orientations whereby individuals are able to give 
some coherence to their social circumstances.36 
35. Clifford Geertz. "Ideology as a Cultural System." in Ideology 
and Discontent. Ed. by David Apter, New York: The Free Press, 1964 •> 
p. 63. 
36. Ibid., p. 51. 
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Lipset and Bell have seen ideology as playing a role only 
in areas in which there is rapid transformation while its impact is 
marginal in the developed societies of the West. Ideologies, they 
maintain, exercise appeal only in those countries which were colonies 
or political dependencies. According to them, ideologies in such 
countries were used as instruments for waging the fight for liberation 
from foreign domination. Ideologies were and are needed to arouse the 
people against foreign rulers. But such arguments do not provide 
sufficient explanation of the political extremism that we find, for 
example, in Latin America. The entire revolutionary package includes 
such standard components as the growth of industrial cities, the 
proliferation of science and secularism, and the drastic broadening of 
the base of political participation. 
In the United States, where most of the attention of the 
exponents of the decline thesis has been focused, doctrinaire Marxism 
and extremist movements may exercise \/ery little appeal and only on a 
small number of people. However, it cannot be argued that commitment 
to an ideology is weak. In the United States, faith in liberal democracy 
still remains strong despite some claims to the contrary. Liberal 
democracy exercises strong appeal and inspires the public. As Selinger 
points out: 
There are no valid logical or empirical 
reasons for denying that democratic 
liberal belief systems can inspire 
intense commitment. The foundation of 
such a commitment is provided by the 
demonstrable reference to central values 
in all political belief systems. Both 
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fascism and communist condemnation of 
bourgeoise morality in society and 
politics has its counterpart in the 
unashamedly moral rejection of the two 
totalitarian systems by reform-minded 
liberal democrats and democratic 
socialists.37 
Indeed, American liberalism today displays a high level of abstraction 
and evokes strong conviction. American liberals view freedom as 
participation and effective choice and are much closer to the "con-
structive rationalism" of Rousseau and Voltaire. This is also attested 
by the fact that communism and socialism have had no important effect in 
the United States as alternative political philosophies. 
Sometimes liberalism appears as merely a ritual preference for 
the middle of the road which leads many to believe that it is dead. But 
liberalism is much more than that for those who adhere to it and its 
adherents are not few. For its adherents, liberalism "is a coherent 
social philosophy which combines the ideals of classical liberalism 
with the psychological and political realities of modern pluralistic 
society."38 The reason why it may appear not as a force capable of 
eliciting the commitment of individuals and it may seem to have become a 
common denominator of American political rhetoric is that people have 
espoused the belief that liberalism survives "basically in a situation 
where long-range goals are feasible and where these goals can be actualized 
by a consensus apparatus. But to have long-range goals presupposes the 
37. Martin Seliger. Ideology and Politics. London: George Allen 
and Unwin Limited, 1976, p. 141. 
38. Irving Louis Horowitz. Foundations of Political Ideology. 
New York: Harper & Row, 1972, p. 141. 
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social system that has time, and presupposes a network of funda-
mental agreements and a series of disagreements on tactical questions."39 
The system, then, must be based on harmonies and equalities and where 
inequalities exist it must attempt to reduce them. There must also 
be an equilibrium between the powerful and the powerless because other-
wise its capacity to achieve its goals will be seriously reduced. The 
attempt to create a network of fundamental agreements has given rise to 
the misapprehension that politics is non-ideological, that there is a 
convergence of political orientations. 
The impression that Western politics is in the process of losing 
its ideological character stems also from the existence of a growing 
belief in deomcratic institutions. If democracy is to flourish, stability 
is an essential prerequisite. Democracy requires that extreme positions 
be reconciled and politics be conducted in an atmosphere that is not 
conducive to the sharpening of conflict. The events of the last thirty-
five years have given rise to a fear of too much politicization, a 
suspicion that intense political commitment and passionate politics 
automatically eventuates in "total" politics-a conception of politics 
advanced by theorists of National Socialism and communism. This fear by 
the public forces political parties to avoid extreme positions because 
most likely they will be penalized by the public. The avoidance of 
extreme positions has been equated by the exponents of the decline-of-
ideology thesis with the decline of ideology. 
39. Irving Louis Horowitz. Foundations of Political Ideology, 
op. cit., p. 143. 
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What we are actually witnessing today is "the ruling trend of 
contemporary theory (which) has been reacting against the more opti-
mistic philosophies of ideologies of the past two centuries; con-
sciously or implicitly, it has been set about deflating the larger ideas 
of human possibilities that recommended themselves to many thinkers in 
the past, and has engaged in the job of cutting our notions of man's 
nature to size."40 The choice today is not between all-inclusive and 
mutually exclusive alternatives. The writers who believed that ideology 
is declining or has declined have assumed that every important character-
istic of a society is connected with a single governing mechanism, that 
a society can be transformed from a central point. They have assumed 
that ideological thinking is totalistic and it adopts global views of 
social structure and political action. It is true that in the past 
attempts were made to transform society and eradicate social evils from 
a central point. But the characteristic of ideology is not the aim to 
transform society from a central point. 
Many people today are convinced that society cannot be trans-
formed globally because such attempts have never been successful. Attempts 
to bring about total transformation lead to perpetual force. Social 
transformation will not be achieved by ideologies that consist of myths, 
superstitions, dogmatism and fanaticism. There is nothing rational 
about such ideologies and for one to claim that such characteristics 
could bring about social reforms and social improvement, "would be as 
40. P. H. Partridge. "Politics, Philosophy, Ideology." 
in Political Philosophy. Ed. by Anthony Quinton, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 40. 
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strange as to say that an earthquake is a good way of producing a 
lake."41 The French Revolution did not succeed in producing the 
results that "ideologists" believed would be achieved because they were 
incompatible with the social reforms it espoused. The totalistic 
illusion has been a cause for many upheavals. All attempts to trans-
form society globally resulted in failures and destruction on a 
monstrous scale. If this totalistic illusion is being abandoned, it 
would be because those who were possessed by such an illusion are 
becoming convinced that the idea of total transformation leads to 
perpetual force and fanaticism which blinds people and prevents them 
from understanding their own limitations. It would also constitute 
evidence that rational ideologies are winning ground by gaining 
adherents; rational ideologies are those that do not exclude the 
possibility of alternative choices and alternative means to achieve 
social reforms. 
It has been argued that there is an acceptance of the belief 
that industrialism, technological innovation, and uninterrupted expansion 
of resources should be the main purposes of social life. It is assumed 
that the acceptance of such a belief renders politics non-ideological. 
However, such a belief is still very much ideological. Man is committed 
to certain purposes which are ethical in nature. 
It has been argued also that today's societies are committed to 
the politics of pragmatism, to the politics of incremental improvement 
41. P. H. Partridge. Politics, Philosophy, Ideology, op. cit., 
p. 40. 
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rather than to thorough reforms. However, even if one prefers a 
system that is committed to incremental improvements rather than 
improvements which can be achieved through thorough reforms, he is 
making an ideological choice. Even Lipset, one of those who force-
fully has argued that ideologies are declining, admits that this 
constitutes an ideological commitment. He states: 
Clearly, commitment to the politics of 
pragmatism, to the rules of the game of 
collective bargaining, to gradual change 
whether in the direction favored by the 
left or the right, to opposition both to 
an all powerful central state and to 
laissez-faire constitutes the component 
parts of an ideology7} The 'agreement on 
fundamentals', the political consensus of 
Western society, now increasingly has come 
to include a position on matters which 
once sharply separated the left from the 
right. And this ideological agreement... 
has become the ideology of the major 
parties in the developed states of Europe 
and America.42 
Even if ideology is to be seen in terms of conflict of ideas, 
in terms of intellectual conflicts among groups representing different 
views, as Lipset sees it, still it cannot be argued that ideologies have 
c 
declined. The disappearance of doctrinal Marxism, if indeed is has 
disappeared, has resulted in more ideological debate. This decline has 
brought a proliferation of sects, each incriminating the other and all 
of which are engaged in a fervent search for alternatives that can ful-
42. S. M. Lipset. "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary 
European Politics." Daedalus, 93 (Winter 1964), p. 296. 
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fill men's desires for communion although none of these groups has 
elaborated a new ideological system or has been able to provide the 
theoretical framework for a mass party. As Aron remarks, ideological 
discussions are incomparably richer now than during the cold war, when 
we had dogmatic assertions from one side and, from the other, apologias 
for the democratic-Keynesian-liberal synthesis.43 
Despite the fact that the right and left have taken as their 
goal the increase of production and a more equitable distribution of the 
fruits of economic progress, there remains plenty of room for social 
and political conflict between the right and left, between socialism 
and liberalism. Aron, in an attempt to clarify his earlier formulations, 
states that: 
The dual allegiance of democratic nations to 
liberalism and egalitarianism creates an 
inevitable and immense disparity between 
what democracy is and what it is supposed to 
be. Only...ideology purports to bridge this 
gap between the real and the ideal. The end 
of ideology meant not the end of ideas but the 
end of pseudorational or rationalistic 
millenarianism of which Marxism-Leninism 
furnished the most recent example.44 
Ideology should not be seen only in terms of adherence to the 
great ideological systems but also in terms of preferences, expectations 
and values not necessarily constituting an elaborate system and one which 
43. Raymond Aron. "On the Proper Uses of Ideology." in Culture and 
its Creators. Ed. by J. David and Terry Clark, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1977, p. 7. 
44. Ibid. 
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is along the lines of the great ideological traditions. When we see 
ideology in such terms, we find that the common people have political 
opinions, in many cases fairly specific ones, and are often critical 
of government action and inaction. Poor and less educated people find 
ways to orient themselves to the political arena and develop points of 
view which we would expect to be fairly consistent over time. They may 
lack ideological clarity, as Converse argues, but we should not mis-
take any absence of clarity for a total absence of views and concerns 
which are ideological in nature. 
CONCLUSION 
The writers who have argued that ideologies have declined have 
confused the decline of something they have found objectionable, namely, 
dogmatism, fanaticism, and in general, those ideologies which have the 
above characteristics such as revolutionary Marxism and Fascism. This 
narrow focus fails to include a broader conceptual framework that would 
permit analytical attention to other aspects of ideology. They have side-
stepped the fascinating subject of a broader ideological analysis and 
have concentrated instead on the central proposition that runs through 
much of their writings, namely, apocalyptic and revolutionary ideologies 
have lost their power to inspire the masses. They also have concentrated 
on the proposition that ideology tends to wane as societies reach levels 
of social and economic modernization typified by several Western countries. 
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Their arguments seem to rest on the assumption that socio-
economic and political developments are moving in a deterministic 
and unilinear direction and towards a kind of society which will 
espouse the Social Democratic values. This leads to another inter-
pretation, namely, that most of the writings are not an analysis of 
ideology but simply more ideology. This has been most forcefully 
stated by William Delany who says that "the end of ideology writers 
write not just as sociologists or social scientists but as journalists 
and an anti-totalitarian ideological cabal. Their work is ideology 
but, almost like all Western ideologies since the 18th century, with 
a heavy 'scientific1 component to give respectability and a sense of 
truth."45 These are harsh judgments but if we look at the develop-
ments everywhere and at the literature about the decline of ideology, 
their assumptions suggest exactly that. One is led to this inter-
pretation by the convergency theory that they have expounded, that the 
two systems are converging giving rise to a society which is governed 
by the principles of Social Democracy. The social democratic society 
allegedly emerges from the convergence of the capitalist and communist 
systems. However, this thesis tends to disregard more fundamental 
differences among social institutions and attitudes. 
The writings of the exponents of the decline of ideology thesis 
seem to reflect also a desire to reject something which they see as 
dogmatic, inflexible, and passionately articulated prescriptions of 
reality. But ideology cannot be defined in this manner and cannot 
45. William Delany. The End of Ideology: A Summation. Paper presented 
at the 1964 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, p. 16. 
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necessarily be seen as an obstacle of human progress. The striving 
towards ultimate ends and the sense of responsibility and purposes are 
not to be regarded as polar opposites, the one being associated with 
chiliastic politics and the other with practical politics or the lack 
of any commitment to an idea. If the politician is to act as the agent 
of social progress, he has to take into account the consequences of 
political action but at the same time have a vision in mind. "Certainly", 
says Weber, "all historical experience confirms the truth that man should 
not have attained the possible unless time and again he reached out for 
the impossible."46 
The exponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis have failed to 
demonstrate that ideologies have declined. It is obvious that the 
exhaustion of political ideas in the West refers to the particular case 
involving the disillusionment that was experienced by Marxist intellectuals 
when it became apparent that many predictions of Marxism did not materialize 
and when the atrocities of the Stalinist regime were publicly revealed. 
This led to an ideological reappraisal. But as La Palombra has remarked, 
"to limit the meaning of ideology to absolute Utopias, to concentrate one's 
analytical attention upon what some Marxist socialists may be up to, and 
to equate certain changes in rhetoric with ideological decline is to 
narrow the meaning of the central concept to the point where it has very 
limited utility for the social scientist."47 
46. Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. From Max Weber. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 20. 
47. Joseph La Palombra. "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and 
Interpretation." American Political Science Review. 60:1 [March 1966), 
p. 8. 
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Among those intellectuals who experienced a disillusionment 
were many of the exponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis. These 
intellectuals became disillusioned with the inability or the refusal of 
other intellectuals to effect radical change. The totalitarianism of 
Soviet Russia forced most of them to move away from Marxism as a 
viable alternative for change. By expounding the decline thesis, they 
were expressing their own feelings. Since Marxism no longer inspired 
them, they went further to assume that Marxism no longer inspired others. 
Thus these intellectuals moved towards an ideological vacuum. Being 
themselves in an ideological vacuum, they hastened to proclaim the end 
of ideology. Having been strong ideological believers, however, they 
could not sit back and observe the political phenomena with indifference. 
They began to look for an alternative to the two systems. The alternative 
was found in the politics of Social Democracy, at least by some. Social 
Democracy, by stressing the need for a mixed economy and by explicitly 
recognizing the private sector, seemed to offer an alternative to those 
who had lost faith in the two great ideological systems. Thus they 
hastened to hail the arrival of Social Democracy which led them to 
formulate the convergence theory. 
It is ironic that while these political theorists were proclaiming 
the end of ideology and while they were making the assertion that Western 
democracies were experiencing the "end of ideology", those who determined 
public policy in the United States were making statements that the Western 
world was living through a time of troubles that could very well be called 
the Age of Ideology. In 1964, the Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara 
- 69 -
testified before a Congressional Committee that the Communist threat 
"is political, it is ideological, it is economic, it is scientific; 
and it extends even into the cultural sphere."48 Eisenhower said in 
his Farewell Address to the nation, "We face a hostile ideology-global 
in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in 
method."49 
I have mentioned these examples to dramatize the argument that 
the writings of these political theorists about the decline of ideology 
expressed the desire to see the emergence of a new ideology. Their 
writings could not be a serious analysis of the political, economic and 
ideological trends of the period when awareness of ideology permeated 
the thoughts of high government officials, of those who determine the 
ideological direction of their countries. Not only did they fail to 
provide a serious analysis of the political, economic and ideological trends 
of that period but they also failed to provide a serious analysis of 
ideology as a concept. They failed to see ideology as a set of values, 
expectations, aspirations and prescriptions. They insisted on seeing 
ideology as something dogmatically articulated regarding class conflict, 
revolution, and mass movements which is not the essential nature of ideology. 
The global concept of ideology as a Utopian vision or a well-
developed sense of justice encompassing a thorough world view should not 
48. Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 88th 
Congress, Second Session (Washington: D. S. Government Printing Office, 
March 25, 1964), pp. 83-84. 
49. The Department of State Bulletin (February 6, 1961), p. 180. 
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obscure more common, mundane concerns. The absence of radical ideologies 
has led the advocates of the thesis that ideologies have declined to 
conclude too quickly that because there were no revolutionary or mass 
movements, there were also no concerns or bitterness. Clearly, many 
people are not satisfied with the existing order although they may have 
some difficulty articulating their criticism. There are people who have 
a series of dissatisfactions with the kind of politics pursued by their 
governments and the activities in which these governments are engaged. 
They are concerned with economic equality, justice, human rights, the 
foreign policies pursued by their government, and other issues. One way 
to reconstruct the concept of ideology is to see it as an expression of 
concern about the distribution of resources, economic or political, as 
the individual sees this distribution. Individuals may see the distri-
bution of resources as best achieved through the Welfare State, communism, 
liberalism, Social Democracy, or any other system that incorporates 
elements of the other social systems. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 
The participants in the Conference on the "Future of Freedom" 
attributed the presumed decline of ideology largely to the emergence 
of an industrial society in which politics would be conducted from a 
non-ideological standpoint. How did they define this post-industrial 
society? Is there such a thing as post-industrial society? How does 
it differ from the industrial society? 
According to the participants, the constituent element of this 
type of society is a movement towards a democratic socialist system. 
Western societies will move through a process of socialization and 
Soviet societies will move through a process of liberalization. Thus we 
should expect the mutually hostile and antagonistic systems to come 
together at some unspecified date in a form of democratic socialism. 
The key notion which will render politics non-ideological is that con-
flicting interests will be reconciled within the framework of the Welfare 
State. This post-industrial society will be defined mainly by its 
scientific spirit. It will have science and technology as its basic 
preconditions. The principles of science and technology will be applied 
to the solution of social problems, thus leaving little scope for 
ideological controversies. Most of the participants of the Conference 
envisioned a post-industrial society which will be capable of incorp-
orating disruptive movements by meeting immediate demands. This society 
will be capable of satisfying discontented people, people who are prepared 
to join and support any movement because it promises to relieve their 
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grievances. It will prevent the emergence of opposition movements, 
movements which consist of an integrating critique of society, because 
there will be a distribution of wealth and a reduction of inequalities 
of any political significance. Thus, movements which have radical 
goals will become important. 
Therefore, the advancement of industrialization is seen as the 
process that logically necessitates the decomposition of social classes 
by causing a growth of affluence which makes possible "a social system 
in which class conflict is minimized"!
 ancj consequently also ideological 
conflict. As a result, cleavages disappear and a consensus will have 
been reached. Such an assumption, however, is erroneous because the 
"industrial" society will never reach a final equilibrium, even if 
differences among classes are minimized, because the contest between the 
forces for uniformity and diversity will give it life and movement and 
change. 
Lipset has also argued that intellectuals in such a society 
will function only as critics of that society because "domestic politics, 
even liberal or socialist politics, can no longer serve as the arena of 
serious criticism from the left."2 The intellectual in this post-
industrial society will reject the radical commitment required by an 
"ethic of consciousness which creates true believers with pure, unquench-
1. Seymour Martin Lipset. The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary 
furopean Politics.op. cit., p. 287. 
2. Political Man: The Social Bases of 
Politics. New York: Doubleday, 1960, p. 408. 
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able flame and can accept no compromise with faith."-3 
Lipset further claims that radical movements in the West have 
ceased to exist because: 
The fundamental political problems of 
the industrial revolution have been 
solved: the workers have achieved 
industrial and political citizenship... 
the democratic left has recognized that 
an increase in overall state power 
carries with it more dangers to free-
dom than solutions for economic problems. 
This very triumph of the democratic 
social revolution in the West ends 
domestic politics for those who must 
have ideologies or Utopias to motivate 
them to political action.4 
In sharp contrast to Upset's arguments stand the arguments 
advanced by some that there will be an increasing intervention in the 
economic sphere by governments to achieve rapid economic growth. The 
public is becoming less apprehensive of strengthened state power and 
is prepared to sacrifice some of its freedoms for the attainment of 
economic growth. Labor organizations will cease to be component parts 
of class movements urging programmes of total reforms but will be a 
part of a web of rules set mainly by the state.5 Contrary to what is 
being argued, however, people today are more troubled by the apparent lesson 
of history that the more the state, in whatever form, attempts to control 
3. Seymour Martin Lipset. Political Man: The Social Bases of 
Politics, op. cit., p. 408. 
4. Ibid., p. 406. 
5. Clark Kerr et al. Industrialism and Industrial Man. London: 
Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 235. 
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society, for whatever desirable ends, the more the individual is 
smothered. 
These political writers have also argued that the post-industrial 
society will be a knowledgeable society. Social objectives and goals 
will be determined by rational criteria. Knowledge and rationality 
will be the criteria by which we will judge policies and political 
action. Knowledge, they imply, will compel a rethinking of value 
positions by challenging assumptions with a reliable knowledge of 
empirical reality. Technology and science will permeate social 
institutions and will transform them. 
The theme was developed first at the Conference of the Congress 
for Cultural Freedom out of which the theme of "the end of ideology" 
developed. The participants came expecting, and in a way inviting, 
a great confrontation of world views. During this Conference it was 
admitted that under the pressure of economic and social knowledge, a 
growing body of research, and the increasing experience of society, 
ideological argument tended to give way to technical argument.6 These 
men must have experienced the effects of ideology in the wery narrowing 
sense of the term as used by Rokeach in The Open and Closed Mind. 
According to Rokeach, the manner in which the characteristics of a 
knowledgeable society reduces ideological thinking, is through the 
reduction of dogmatic thinking. Dogmatic thinking can be conceived as a 
6. Daniel Bell. "The End of Ideology in the West", in The End of Ideology. 
Glencoe: Free Press, 1960; Edward Shils. "The End of Ideology?" 
Encounter. 5 (November, 1955), pp. 52-58; S. M. Lipset. "The End of 
Ideology?" in Political Man, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960. 
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selection and interpretation of information so as to reinforce a 
previously established creed, dogma, or political ideology. Information 
is used not so much as a means of understanding the world as it is in 
reality, but as a means of defending against conflict and uncertainty.'' 
The knowledgeable society puts a greater stress on the use of infor-
mation, relying on its truth and not on any defence. This should be 
associated with the decline in dogmatic thinking. For the exponents of 
the decline-of-ideology thesis, the decline of dogmatism apparently 
implies the decline of ideology. 
The theory of the knowledgeable society was picked up and 
developed further by Robert Lane who asserts that the criteria and 
scope of politics are shrinking while those of knowledge are growing. 
As a consequence, ideology declines. According to Robert Lane, public 
policy in the so-called knowledgeable society will be characterized by 
the displacement of politics and ideology, caused by the constant ex-
pansion of "knowledge": 
If one thinks of the domain of 'pure 
polities' where decisions are determined 
by calculations of influence, power, or 
electoral advantage, and a domain of pure 
knowledge where decisions are determined 
by calculations of how to implement agreed-
upon values with rationality and 
efficiency, it appears to me that the 
political domain is shrinking and the 
knowledge domain is growing, in terms of 
criteria for deciding, kinds of counsel 
sought, evidence adduced, and the nature of 
the 'rationality' employed.8 
7. Milton Rokeach. The Open and Closed Mind. New York: Basic Books, 
1960, pp. 67-97. 
8. Robert Lane. "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable 
Society," The American Sociological Review, 31.(QCt0ber 1966)» PP- 567-568. 
- 76 -
With respect to ideology Lane asserts: 
If we employ the term ideology to mean 
a comprehensive, passionately believed, 
self-activating view of society, 
usually organized as a social movement 
rather than as a latent half-conscious 
belief system, it makes sense to think 
of a domain of knowledge distinguishable 
from the domain of ideology, despite the 
extent to which they may overlap. Since 
knowledge and ideology serve somewhat 
functional equivalents in orienting a 
person towards the problems he must face 
and the policies he must select, the 
growth of the domain of knowledge causes 
it to impinge on the domain of ideology.9 
There is, however, another side of the argument, a side that 
Lane does not elaborate.. Ideology and politics are just as likely 
to impinge upon the domain of "knowledge" as "knowledge" is likely to 
impinge upon the domain of ideology and politics. The neglect of this 
part of the knowledge-politics-ideology relationship stems from a view 
of knowledge as being a monolithic commodity with a fairly uniform 
impact upon public policy. By not distinguishing among kinds and uses 
of knowledge, such a view tends to confuse "knowledge" with the process 
of bureaucratic administration. 
When Lane describes "knowledge" as a domain distinctive from 
ideology and politics, it becomes similar in concept to bureaucracy in 
the traditional Weberian senseJO The operative definition of knowledge 
9. Robert Lane. The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Know-
ledgeable Society, op. cit., p. 660. 
10. H. Geerth and C. Wright Mills. From Max Weber. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1958, pp. 196-244. 
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which is characteristic of highly developed bureaucracies, according 
to this concept, is bureaucratic epistemology. This is the screen 
through which all information must pass to be examined before it 
becomes knowledge. This screen is one of the basic agencies by which the 
autonomy of process is ensured J1 
Furthermore, according to this concept, bureaucracy is a value-
free instrument, just a tool, which men must decide how to use by 
standards drawn from some other sources than the realms of science, 
technology, and bureaucracy. However, it is misleading to say that 
bureaucracy or science are neutral means that can be used to achieve an 
end. Here the means profoundly shape the ends. Bureaucracy may have 
no ultimate values, but it has a host of instrumental values, and among 
these is a conception of what counts as knowledge or useful information. 
This bureaucratic epistemology shapes so decisively the outcomes that if 
we assign a certain task to the bureaucratic agency, we can say before-
hand how the bureaucratic epistemology will constitute and alter the task 
itself. 
The error in the first arguments, that industrialization will 
produce structures and processes which will decompose classes, lies in 
the assumption that a particular value system leads necessarily to 
particular processes and structures and that this value system is spread 
evenly through the society. What happens, however, is the contrary. 
Industrialization produces conflicting orientations. It produces value 
11. Kenneth Keniston. The Uncommitted: Alientated Youth in American 
Society, New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1967, pp. 253-72. 
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patterns which are not shared by all classes in the industrial society. 
It has been demonstrated that the adoption of equality of opportunity 
as the norm in the middle class is likely to inspire opposite, com-
pensating values in those who do not reach a socially acceptable standard 
of successJ2 Robert Lane has found also that industrialization, as far 
as the working classes are concerned, is not accompanied by values that 
distinguish them from agricultural or feudal societies J 3 industrialization 
not only does not resolve fundamental problems but it is likely to 
accentuate class conflict and social turmoil. Economic differences do 
not clearly decrease and can even be maintained or subjectively increased 
by industrialization. As Robert Lane remarks: 
It is important to remember that the affluent 
society still includes a large number of \/ery 
poor people: the average income of the 
poorest fifth of the families...in the United 
States in 1962 was $1,662 and this had to 
provide for a little over three people on the 
average. The term 'affluence' is clearly 
relative both to other societies and previous 
periods.14 
Advanced industrialization may widen the gap that exists among various 
classes in society. Advanced industrialization requires specialization 
and high skills which can be acquired by education. However, since 
education is more accessible to the affluent classes, the distance between 
12. Robert K. Merton. "Social Structure and Anomie," in Social Structure. 
New York: The Free Press, 1957, p. 135. 
13. Robert Lane. Political Ideology: Why the Common Man Believes What 
He Does. New York: The Free Press, 1962, p. 80. 
14. "The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence." 
American Science Review » 59:4 (December 1965 0, p. 876. 
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the low and the upper classes will become longer. In fact it may 
increase discontent and sharpen conflict. 
Industrialization, then, cannot provide any guarantee that 
economic barriers separating social groups will be removed and that 
the political significance of economic inequality will disappear. 
A rise in the level of production and consumption is basically what 
can be achieved but this is not of overriding importance. As soon 
as the basic economic issues will be resolved, other issues will 
emerge. Indeed, the realignment that took place in the United States 
between 1968-1972 reflected ideological differences on newly emerging 
issues. As the importance of basic economic issues declined, a con-
sensus was not achieved. Usually, after a realignment takes place, 
the losing party moves toward the position of the victorious party to 
reattract the lost voters. Thus, the parties converge ideologically 
and a consensus is achieved. But this did not happen during the above-
mentioned period. With the resolution of basic economic issues, other 
issues came into the surface which are referred to as social issues.'^ 
The new issues that may emerge can be more serious than the economic 
issues that are resolved as soon as the public ceases to be preoccupied 
with such issues. 
Not only does economic development not lead to the disappearance 
of ideological conflict or a consensus on issues but it can accentuate 
15. Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg. The Real Majority. 
New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1970. 
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ideological conflict. One of the consequences of an increase in 
affluence, which will result from economic development, will be an 
increase in literacy, education and exposure to the information 
which will promote greater political activity and interest in 
politics. Expansion of participation will result in an increase 
of political efficacy and an increase in the knowledge of political 
and social problems. This, in turn, will increase the need for the 
society to do something about these problems and if it is unable to 
resolve them, more political conflict will be generated. Effective 
government action will be more difficult and increased demands for 
social change and innovation will be more difficult to satisfy. The 
conflict will be in proportion to the gap that will exist between 
what the government can accomplish and the ideas people will have as 
to what the government ought to accomplish. Such a conflict will 
place enormous strain on political parties to meet the various demands. 
Thus, instead of a convergence of ideological positions of the political 
parties, we may have a divergence of ideological positions. This will 
be the case because political parties will be forced to espouse the 
cause of the social groups that will demand social action and innovation, 
a more equitable distribution of the benefits of the industrial society 
and an improvement in the quality of their lives. On the other side 
will be those who will have e^ery reason to defend the benefits that 
have accrued to them from industrialization. 
Education and increased exposure to information will give rise 
to enhanced aspirations and expectations. If these aspirations and 
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expectations are not satisfied, people will be motivated to be 
involved in politics to exert more and stronger pressure on their 
governments. Thus, the economic development and improvement which 
is supposed to satisfy needs and fulfill certain aspirations, may, 
in fact, exacerbate these aspirations and generate others. 
Social mobilization is another consequence of economic develop-
ment and industrialization. In turn, the consequence of social 
mobilization is that classes are no longer composed of individuals 
whose social position is an inherited and inescapable fate. Individuals 
begin to realize that they have the power to advance their claims and 
alter social conditions. Thus, industrialization "increases capacities 
for group organization and consequently the strength of group demands 
on government, which the government is unable to satisfy."16 
Economic development must be accompanied by an increase in 
equality of conditions otherwise the process of economic development 
is itself a shock to the integrative functions of society.!7 What 
happens, however, is that industrialization increases the income of some 
people absolutely but not relatively and hence increases their dis-
satisfaction with the existing order.18 Furthermore, industrialization 
16. Eric A. Nordlinger. Politics and Society. Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1970, p. 325. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Samuel Huntington. Political Order in Changing Societies. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, ch. 1. 
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disrupts social solidarity by abolishing the differentiation 
of social roles. People come into contact with more heterogeneous 
groups, the flow of information is facilitated, and an openness is 
created. The cost of this openness is a weaker set of affective 
ties linking individuals to the social system.^ The question is, 
then, if developed societies can afford the costs in social solid-
arity of these weak ties. 
Industrialization and economic progress reduce the number of the 
propertyless and increases private ownership which gives increasing 
numbers of people something to defend and therefore gives them a stake 
in the social system in which they live. Furthermore, the gradual 
improvement of living conditions arouses a hope that the revolutionary 
fervour decreases as well as the desire to drastically reform the 
existing social system which is undesirable for the left. Thus, the 
left would be preparing its own demise by abandoning its intransigence, 
which has been interpreted by some as a convergence of ideological 
positions. Consequently, the left may be forced to adopt again a 
radical stand on social issues and abandon its previous moderate stand. 
Indeed, Robert Lane has found that more people are now looking towards 
the future as a period which offers a greater promise of a happier 
life.2° 
19. Samuel Huntington. Political Order in Changing Societies, 
op. cit., ch. 1. 
20. Robert Lane. The Politics of Consensus in the Age of Affluence, 
op. cit., p. 878. 
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An increased optimism, however, which is generated by 
industrialization and economic development, may have other con-
sequences. As it has been remarked, "...the technological society 
has produced unprecedented freedom from want, from insecurity, from 
poverty, hunger, and disease, and...these real gains make possible 
the most radical visions of a possible future."21 The problem is 
that, when one envisions a brighter future, he tends to become more 
dissatisfied with the current state of affairs and thus becomes 
anxious to change things. Also, when a society becomes more affluent, 
it abandons traditional orientations. A great sense of mastery over 
fate emerges and individuals cease to see themselves as helpless objects 
of forces beyond human control and acquire a faith that great goals 
can be attained. As a consequence, they may agitate for radical reforms. 
Agitation for radical reforms can result from our efforts to 
achieve goals through rational and efficient calculations, from efforts 
to subordinate qualitative dimensions to the common, external, and 
quantifiable.^2 In that case people will require power which strives 
to become authority that will respond to human needs, to those questions 
which have meaning for men. The uprisings, the challenging of 
established institutions and processes that we have witnessed are the 
cries of people who feel that the processes and powers which control 
21. Clark Kerr. The Uses of the University. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1963, p. 20. 
22. Michael Novak. "An End of Ideology?" Commonweal'. 8 ("March 
1968} p. 682. 
- - 84 -
their lives are inhumane and unresponsive to their needs and aspira-
tions. Before the "Age of Affluence", a survey was conducted to 
determine what percentage of the American population was happy. The 
findings revealed that forty-three percent of the respondents were 
yery happy. In 1957 an almost identical question was asked and only 
thirty-five percent reported themselves to be very happy.23 This 
suggests that economic prosperity is not the only criterion of 
happiness and satisfaction. Economic development will provide mankind 
with a sufficient surplus of wealth and leisure and consequently with 
more time than the present for activities of the mind. 
But once the body and mind "have been liberated, at least 
partially, from the tyranny of the environment, they have still to be 
liberated from the subtler tyrannies which society, morality and science 
itself exercise over them for their own good."24 Science has tended 
to limit human participation in control. It reduces the human role to 
supplying the machines with inputs and data materials. Decision-making 
is increasingly taken away from men and given over to machines and 
routine processes. Technical rationality becomes a dominant orientation 
of thought which tends to limit the freedom of social perception. But 
once it ceases to be the dominant orientation of human thought, the 
human mind will strive for the attainment of other ideals and goals and 
this may be manifested in higher political interest. 
Modern societies have become like self-regulating machines and 
as the system grows more and more complex, each individual is able to 
23. Lane, Robert. The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence. 
op. c.it., p. 878. • • 
24. Charles Madge. Society in the Mind: Elements of Social Eidos. 
London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 1964, p. 142. 
- 85 -
understand and control less and less of it. This kind of society is 
bound to provoke reaction and an increased political interest and 
concern because it is destructive. We can expect increased political 
interest and concern "because these attitudes are generally related to 
higher income and an improved capacity to take an interest in matters 
other than immediate day-to-day breadwinning problems."25 
All the writings about political developments in the post-
industrial society appear to rest on the assumption that socio-economic 
and political developments are moving in a deterministic unilinear-
cultural -specific direction whereby the future will be free of dogmatic, 
inflexible, passionately held and articulated prescriptions of reality 
and perceptions of the future. All these writings are reminiscent of 
classical Marxism. For Marx saw Marxism as having an independence of 
existing social structures and hence an objectivity which rescued it 
from the relativity of the ideological thought which he diagnosed in 
his opponents. It was only in the communist future,that the social roots 
of ideological thinking would be destroyed and ideology would finally 
disappear. These writings are also reminiscent of the Marxist view 
that the state will wither away. The predictions that were made with 
respect to trends in the European Community reinforce this impression. 
It was frequently assumed and stated that Europe was becoming depoliticized, 
and that the great rifts that had split the continent over the past years 
were disappearing. Ideologies, it has been stated, have lost their hold. 
Europe was gravitating towards a new kind of society; it was becoming a 
25. Lane, Robert. The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence. 
op'. cit.V p. 876. - - -' 
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consumer society, a classless society. In these circumstances, a 
"consensus government" would emerge and several persuasive generaliza-
tions were made. This "consensus government" would break national 
barriers and dissolve national loyalties,, opening the road towards 
political integration. Lipset asserted that "The dominant structural 
trend in Europe involves the final triumph of the values of the 
industrial society, the end of rigid status class derivative from the 
pre-industrial world."26 
Aron also expressed the view that the workers are becoming 
satisfied with material well-being and are inclined to support a new 
European government which offers the material advantages. He states: 
"Throughout Western Europe the type of society some call technical 
and others scientific, has come into existence and it disputes the 
system of human relations inherited from the ancien regime or from the 
bourgeois property-oriented of the last century."27 However, integration 
in Europe is yery unlikely to come from a shift of loyalty to a new 
center because the Community will be seen as providing material benefits 
to people. More than anything else, it will depend on the Community's 
ability to fulfill spiritual aspirations but n°t by becoming a powerful 
productive unit which will raise the standard of living. This will only 
castrate the Community of its political ideals and render it incapable 
of animating and inspiring the new generations. 
26. S. M. Lipset. "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary 
European Politics." Daedalus, 93, Winter, 1964, p. 287. 
27. Raymond Aron. "Old Nations, New Europe." Daedalus, 93 (Winter 1964), 
p.'44.. 
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The various theorists have seen common fears, common 
interests, co-operation in economic areas and common economic 
policies as the integrating force but they have overlooked or have 
not stressed enough the creation of an ideology as being essential 
to the integrative process. 
Just as the Soviet State has not withered away, despite 
Marx's predictions, so the major problems of the European Community 
or any other society have not been solved to the satisfaction of the 
general public. Political and socio-economic developments, whether 
in Europe or in America, have not moved in a deterministic way. 
Lipset had predicted also that an increase in economic productivity 
in affluent industrial societies would bring about an equitable 
distribution of gratifications, material and non-material. This re-
distribution in turn would mitigate against hostility and tensions and 
thus ideological consensus would be achieved.28 However, the age of 
political consensus has not been achieved and this has created the need 
for a new perspective that would explain the political cleavages that 
are still persisting and even increasing in the face of affluence.29 
Perhaps the age of political consensus has not come about 
because advanced industrialization produces a changing stratification 
system which alters older forms of political conflict and provides the 
basis for the emergence of new forms. These conflicts have serious con-
sequences for collective problem solving, and they may be so aggregated 
28. Harold Wilenski. "Class, Class Consciousness and American Workers." 
in Labour in Changing America. Ed. by William Hebert, New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., 1966, pp. 12-43. 
29. Robert Lane. The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence. 
°P- c it.,
 p. 878. 
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as to produce pervasive strains. There are built-in limitations in 
the trend towards a greater equality, as far as material benefits are 
concerned. If redistribution of income continues, we may reach the 
point where productivity will decline and this appears to be taking 
place in some countries that have attempted to redistribute income in 
a more equitable manner. Workers will be less motivated to work and 
consequently they will produce less. As the income of the worker 
increases, he will be motivated to substitute work for leisure. Further-
more, the new middle class that will emerge from increased economic 
prosperity, instead of contributing to political consensus, will become 
a potential combatant. The upper-working class and the lower-working 
class will be pitted against those above them and those below them.30 
On the other hand, as people become more prosperous, they take on the 
known attitudes of prosperous individuals in an earlier period. That is, 
they become conservative and they will oppose any important social 
change and reforms, thus producing more cleavages. In the first case, 
the two extremes, which are the result of stratification, become 
potential forces for change. Those who are in the middle of the 
distribution will want to consolidate their gains and will oppose any 
attempts for change, thus becoming conservative; they create a force 
of conservatism which reacts to the institution of any social measures 
and reforms. 
Perhaps programmes based on ideological postulates of nineteenth-
century socialism or liberalism have lost their appeal and many people 
30. Harold Wilenski. Class, Class Consciousness and American Workers, 
op. cit., pp. 12-43. 
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have espoused the belief of incremental improvements and have 
abandoned the instrumental conception of the state. This, however, 
by no means implies that ideologies exercise no appeal or that we 
have reached an age of non-ideological politics. The world has 
acquired a vast amount of experience and in the light of this 
experience old ideas and beliefs are reconstituted. Many of the old 
assumptions have been abandoned, such as the faith in the common man 
and his powers to understand complex problems, as well as many of the 
rationalistic assumptions. 
The conservatives have abandoned the notion that evil exists 
independently of social or economic maladjustments and that we should 
search for the sources of our discomforts in the defective human nature 
rather than in the defective social order. Many of the reforms that 
have been accepted as a compromise constitute evidence that politics 
are not characterized by the attribution of absolute values to any pro-
grammes. This is mainly because liberalism and conservatism were founded 
on democratic principles. The ideology of democracy is not committed 
to any particular ideas but only to those processes of freely given 
consent which enable human beings to determine what kind of economic 
life they want. Under a democratic system, individuals are free not 
only to choose any system they prefer but also to abandon it. Democracy 
is experimental in its outlook and sees many possible solutions rather 
than those given by doctrinaires. Totalitarian ideologies, such as Marxism, 
on the other hand, become a matter of religion. They are characterized 
31. Sidney Hook. Political Power and Personal Freedom. New York: 
Collier Books, 1962, p. 167. 
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by the tendency to act dogmatically without regard to circumstances. 
Although we may be bereft of ideologies in the sense of 
explanations of the world which serve to bring order out of chaos, 
people have not ceased to look at political matters through ideological 
prisms. The optimism of the "end of ideology" ideologues, like Daniel 
Bell, Lipset, Shils and Brzezinski, comes only from their naive belief 
that professional social scientists have developed paradigms to explain 
and direct social changes and that such social scientists will be the 
"technotricians" of the coming (?) post-industrial age. Alas, such 
faith appears without merit, and brute nominalism makes more sense. 
If social issues were directed by science and technology, the result 
would be an ever-increasing loss of basic political control and social 
direction. If science and technology held sway, they would remove the 
total social framework in which ends are chosen from the scope of 
reflection and rational reconstruction. Technical control requires a 
type of action that implies domination. It would be synonymous with 
the institutionalization of a form of domination whose political character 
becomes intolerable. Furthermore, the very concept of applying scientific 
criteria in political decisions is very much ideological. As it has been 
remarked, "the place of scientific thought in ideological formulations 
is an empirical question that should not be begged by the assumption that 
science and ideology are incompatible."32 When society enshrines the 
scientific society, certainly it engages in the most fundamental kind of 
ideological thinking. 
32. Joseph La Palombra. Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and 
Interpretation, op. cit., p. 9. 
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Implicit in the discussion of the industrial society is the 
notion of an ultimate movement toward a static equilibrium of the 
social forces and a denial of the continued relevance of moral and 
human ideas. But societies are not moving toward an ultimate static 
equilibrium; there is nothing unavoidable about the direction of 
social development. Every society contains fluidity and dynamism; 
it is not closed to change. People are reappraising values and goals 
and are constantly exploring new conceptions of the good society and the 
means which will bring about this good society. 
CONCLUSION 
From what has been discussed, the conclusion can be drawn that 
the political writers who have argued that ideologies have ended have 
misconstrued what happens to man's political interests, behavior, and 
attitudes towards politics as society becomes more affluent. Several 
plausible hypotheses have been exanined with respect to the attitudinal 
change that may occur in the affluent society. 
They also have misconstrued another trend in the so-called 
knowledgeable society, a trend according to which social thought would 
strive towards a search for a new objective, scientific basis for social 
theory. Consequently, radical critics who would see a need for some 
more comprehensive social doctrine which would shape particular 
criticisms and reforms to a clearly perceived end, which would lift us 
out of the present "malaise", would disappear. But let us see what one 
of the exponents of this theory, Seymour Lipset, has to say today: 
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"There are more radical teachers who are openly political in the 
classrooms today than, say, 15 years ago."33 This statement is based 
on surveys conducted by Dr. Lipset himself and according to which 
forty-five percent of today's college professors in the United States 
consider themselves leftists.34 "if you take the young social scientists, 
you will find that a total of maybe 20 to 25 percent are Marxists", he 
says. 
This dramatic surge of Marxism is bound to provoke strong 
reaction from the opposite side and intense ideological debate. Not 
only is the domain of ideology not shrinking, as Robert Lane asserted, 
but it appears to be expanding. The strong challenge of liberal 
democracy may have yet to come. Perhaps Sartre was right when he said 
that "Marxism is still yery young, almost in its infancy. It has barely 
started to develop."35 
The discussions on ideology by the proponents of the decline 
thesis have also overlooked or slighted the obvious preferences of the 
poorer members of society for an increased degree of economic well-being 
and a more equitable distribution of the society's resources. In 
particular, if we reflect on the analysis of ideology that has been 
offered by Lane, we can draw the following conclusions. A large segment 
of the population has many grievances concerning both what the government 
33. Quoted by The National Enquirer. December 19, 1978, p. 5. 
34. Ibid., p. 5. 
35. Quoted by T. B. Bottomore. Critics of Society. London: George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1969, p. 127. 
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does and what it fails to do, ranging from civil rights, to taxation, 
to racial integration, to space programmes, to foreign warsj-e1©?. 
Redistribution of income in a more equitable manner f'elilains a 
\/ery serious issue and arouses strong sentiments. Increased productivity 
has resulted in lessening the harsh contrasts between the ridWearid poor; 
but it has by no means done away with the differences, or wfthathe 
strong "sentiments they arouse, in the United States or other countries. 
s 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
To summarize what has been discussed so far with respect to 
the analysis of the dec!ine-of-ideology thesis, we can say that the 
fundamental problem associated with that perspective is the misplaced 
reliance on a presumed convergence of the great ideological systems. 
The problem that haunts these writers' analysis of the strength of 
ideology is the consequence of their failure to view ideology as some-
thing other than rigid dogma, blind faith and "apocalyptic beliefs 
that refuse to specify the costs and consequences of the changes they 
envision."1 Thus, the convergence (?) of the two major ideologies, 
according to the decline thesis, signifies an abandonment of such 
apocalyptic beliefs, a convergence which, it is assumed, is the con-
sequence of (a) an increase in affluence, (b) an increase of the 
strength of the politics of democratic socialism and (c) the victory 
of science and the application of scientific criteria in political 
decisions. This concept has placed the emphasis on knowledge, tech-
nology and rationality. According to it, a society will emerge in which 
the governing of man is replaced by the administration of things. 
The concept of science and rationality in the application of 
politics has an old and respectable intellectual history and has a strong 
ideological connotation. It was developed in the nineteenth century as 
a result of man's efforts to transcend the conflicts and irrationalities 
1. Daniel Bell. The End of Ideology, op. cit. 
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of power. It was believed that a society should be constituted in a 
manner that would be consistent with the principles of science. The 
theoretical foundations of Social Democracy are based on science. Social 
Democrats were declaring that in striving to attain their aims and 
goals, they were following the principles of science. The formulation 
of any theories which aimed at solving social problems should be based 
on objective proof. If the methods employed to solve social problems 
were not capable of such proof, it was no longer science but it was 
resting on subjective impulses, on mere desire or opinion.^ The concept 
has been revived today as similar efforts are being made by socialist 
or non-socialist intellectuals to prescribe such a society. In the West, 
intellectuals are making serious efforts to develop the theory that 
industrialization will achieve this goal. Bell believes that politics 
will be insulated from socio-economic change and will reflect its own 
dynamic. Such ideas are reminiscent of Marx's theory according to which 
scientific understanding is objective and free from the distortions he 
reserved for legal, political, and social theories. 
The concept is not only ideological in the sense that it pre-
scribes a particular form of social organization, but it is ideological 
in the sense that it has been the subject of intense controversy and has 
been criticized for the moral consequences it entails. Habermas has 
argued that science and technology have become a form of ideology, a 
distortion of reality, which serve vested interests and prevailing 
2. E. Bernstein. Evolutionary Socialism: A Criticism and Affirmation. 
Translated by Edith C. Harvey, New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1909, p. 1. 
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institutions. In other words, science has itself become a social 
institution which no longer serves the interests of man but instead 
makes man its servant, enslaving his critical faculties, perpetuating 
the existing state of affairs. 
According to Habermas, when science attains a monopoly in the 
guidance of human action, all relations to life will be blocked out 
under the slogan of neutrality or value freedom.3 According to the 
criteria of technological rationality, agreement on a collective value 
system can never be achieved by means of technological discussion 
carried on in public politics, by a way of a consensus rationally 
arrived at. A society that integrates science within it as a productive 
force only insulates itself from critical insight. The danger of an 
exclusively technical civilization should be clearly grasped; it is 
threatened by the splitting of its consciousness, and by the splitting 
of human beings into two classes—the social engineer and the inmates 
of closed institutions.^ 
Marcuse has followed a similar line of criticism. He argues 
that technology provides the great rationalization of the unfreedom of 
man and demonstrates the technical impossibility of being autonomous, of 
determining one's life. Technological rationality protects rather than 
cancels the legitimacy of domination and the instrumentalist horizon 
of reason opens on rationally totalitarian society.5 
3. Jurgen Habermas. Theory and Practice. Translated by John Viertel. 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1973, p. 271. 
4. Ibid., p. 282. 
5. Herbert Marcuse. Reason and Revolution. Boston: Beacon Press, 
1960, p. 376. 
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The arguments that the two systems are converging have been 
presented very lightly by the political theorists who have expounded 
the decline-of-ideology thesis. These arguments do not provide any 
evidence that ideology is declining. Even if we assume that the West 
and East are modifying their positions on certain issues, it would not 
mean that issues are not seen through ideological prisms, that individ-
uals have ceased to be motivated by ideologies or that societies have 
abandoned values and principles. If, on the other hand, a departure 
from nineteenth-century ideological orientations is taken to constitute 
evidence that ideologies have declined, the exponents of the decline 
thesis are committing a serious error. This cannot provide the basis 
for an argument that ideologies have lost their relevance. Conservatism, 
for example, has taken a dual path. It has taken the form of modern 
conservatism and remained within the mainstream of liberal democracy. 
If intellectuals today made any efforts to propagate conservative ideas 
based on eighteenth-century postulates their efforts would be doomed to 
failure. Liberalism, too, has followed different paths. In modern 
history it has been concerned about, and has been pressing for, the goals 
of greater freedom, social equality, and more meaningful democracy. 
The same goals, however, have been espoused by socialists although they 
believe that these goals can only be attained within a different insti-
tutional framework. Thus, the liberals today are more concerned with 
preserving and successfully defending those institutions which already 
exist rather than creating more liberal institutions. Liberalism has 
taken a conservative attitude. Liberals are reluctant to expound the 
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philosophy of liberalism because this would give their enemies a 
weapon with which to attack the society of liberalism.6 This attitude 
is reflected in their refusal to institute comprehensive social policies, 
to reform existing institutions, and to press for greater freedom. To 
argue, then, that liberals are modifying their ideological positions to 
the point where we can speak of convergence of the positions of Marxism 
and liberalism is very absurd. 
Not only can we not speak meaningfully of convergence of Marxism 
and liberalism, but we cannot speak of the disappearance of radicalism 
and radical movements in the West. The Communist Party has a mass base 
in Italy, France, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Germany, although in 
Germany it is suppressed. In the United States there is a significant 
number of radicals but their cause has not been espoused by any political 
party. The reason for this is mainly the fact that an opposition party 
to the existing political parties cannot exist because of reasons such 
as election laws, the existence of plurality of groups which serve as a 
cushion to absorb disruptive conflict and divide the focus of individuals. 
Also, there has always been the "foreign threat" which has been used 
to discredit any communist movements. 
I have also considered the argument that high and widespread 
levels of economic well-being and affluence lead to a decline in the 
strength of ideologies because they lead to the creation of a society 
that is non-political. But this argument suffers from many weaknesses 
6. Max Bel off. Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process. 
Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1955, pp. 5-7. 
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and fails to provide any evidence which would support it. Economic 
development and economic progress, which is the consequence of 
industrialization, will produce serious cleavages. Some social 
classes will gain in social status and economic positions, whether 
these gains will be relative or absolute, and others will lose in status 
and economic positions, either relatively or absolutely. This will 
sharpen the sense of injustice among the public and intensify demands 
for a more equitable distribution of resources. 
Another consequence, which will result from increased economic 
prosperity, is that as economic issues are becoming less important, 
as man becomes less preoccupied with economic problems, his attention 
will be released for other submerged issues and conflicts, such as 
human rights, foreign and military policies, ethnic issues, etc. 
In summary, it can be stated that the Marxist view of ideology 
underlies the thinking of most of the exponents of the decline thesis. 
However, they have gone beyond Marx in extending the pejorative 
connotations of the term, such as fanaticism, chiliastic optimism, 
radicalism, etc. The atrocities committed by the Nazi regime and, in 
general, the disastrous consequences of the Second World War made many 
realize that ideologies tended to split the world into hostile camps and 
they hastened to denounce ideologies. They committed the error, however, 
of judging all ideologies en bloc and not in the light of their own 
respective practices and envisageable consequences. Thus, the discussion 
of ideologies was altered from one of analysis to that of a concern for 
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their effects. Many of the political theorists, specifically Bell, 
concluded that the power of ideology lies in its ability to generate 
passion. This is evidenct when Bell says that those who speak of the 
end of ideology mainly mean to reject the kind of commitment which had 
such a disastrous effect on the thought and policies of the radical 
movements of the past two generations.^ Thus Bell thought that this 
kind of passion had diminished during the 1950s and hence he proclaimed 
the end of ideology. At the same time he was expressing the hope that 
ideologies would be replaced by the objectivity of social science 
without taking into consideration the possibility that social sciences 
could be "politicized", that ideologies could influence the social 
sciences. Marx thought that the repository of objectivity was the 
proletariat. Bell and others thought that social scientists were the 
repository of objectivity. 
It can be further stated that the exponents of the decline 
thesis have confused the exhaustion of ideologies for the radical 
intellectuals with the obsolescence and disutility of ideologies as 
instruments for the creation of the Utopian society. 
The end of ideology occurs only within two 'jery narrow circles: 
the new intelligentsia of bureaucrats and social scientists and the dis-
illusioned and exhausted ex-militants of the Left. Having lost faith 
in miraculous changes, these intellectuals espoused the principles of 
Social Democracy. Also, since they lost faith that ideologies can be 
7. Daniel Bell and David Aiken. "Ideology-A Debate". Commentary, 
38 , (October "196"4), pp.~ 69-76. 
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employed as vehicles for the formation and guidance of social 
behavior, they replaced the role of ideology with science and 
technology in ordering human attitudes. Thus the decline-of-
ideology thesis becomes more of an ideology rather than serious 
social science. 
-102-
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6L0SSARY 
Capital ism: Under Capital ism the economy is organized in a 
manner in which the means of production are p r iva te ly 
owned. In addi t ion to the pr ivate ownership o f the 
means o f product ion, there are the fo l lowing elements: 
(1) a mult i tude of competing producers, 
(2) no government interference in the economy, 
(3) the market is the regulator of the competi t ion, 
(4) no respons ib i l i t y by the state fo r the people's 
economic wel fare. 
Communism: Communism is the name appropriated by Marx to his 
own very different kind of socialism. He chose the 
word Communism to distinguish his "scientific" 
socialism from "Utopian" socialism of earlier theorists. 
In a narrower use, "Communism" is that state of 
affairs which will prevail when the Marxist scheme is 
accomplished with the principle of "from each according 
to his abilities, to each according to his needs". 
Consensus: The notion that people and part ies are ideo log ica l l y 
close to one another on basic issues. A far-reaching 
agreement on p o l i t i c a l a l ternat ives and the adoption 
by people and part ies of s imi lar standpoints on 
social and p o l i t i c a l ends, according to the exponents 
of the decl ine-of- ideology thes is , s i gn i f i es a re t rea t 
from ideology. 
Conservatism: A human attitude 
which was turned 
challenges that developed 
These challenges resulted 
proposing radical changes 
design and manipulation, 
ward by the Conservatives 
responsibility to preserve 
ations to come. 
or a predisposition to resist change 
into a political doctrine because of 
in recent Western history, 
from the growing fashion for 
in society by deliberate 
The main argument put for-
was that men bore a heavy 
much of the past for gener-
Convergence Theory: The theory that has been expounded by some of the 
proponents of the decl ine-of- ideology thesis that 
the socio-economic systems of the East and West were 
becoming more s imi la r and gradually would converge. 
The theory was used in support of the argument that 
ideologies were dec l in ing . 
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Democratic 
Social ism: 
False 
Consciousness: 
Keynesian: 
Democractic Socialism accepts the value of the 
parliamentary approach to power and re jects the 
Marxist b e l i e f in the i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f the collapse 
of Capital ism as a resu l t o f i t s supposed inherent 
tendency to concentrate economic.power with i t s 
consequent impoverishment of the workers. On the 
other hand, i t re jects the c lass ica l l i be ra l idea 
that the general good flows from ind iv idual compe-
t i t i o n . I t advocates an economy that i s often 
planned although i t does not advocate the complete 
abo l i t i on o f pr ivate property. 
False consciousness, according to Marx, is the notion 
that human thought is the d is tor ted re f l ec t i on of 
r e a l i t y . The understanding o f r e a l i t y i s de f i c i en t 
and needs to be remedied by persuasion i f possible 
and by coercion i f necessary. 
According to Lord Keynes, the f a i t h in laissez f a i r e 
was vanishing and society was growing more doubtful 
of the wisdom o f the o ld economic ideas because o f 
the serious breakdown of economic l i f e during the 
Depression. Democratic Soc ia l is ts are in agreement 
wi th Lord Keynes in his b e l i e f that the state ought 
and is able t o , formulate po l ic ies that serve the 
community rather than one par t i cu la r class or group. 
to, 
Leninism: 
L iberal ism: 
Lenin formulated cer ta in theoret ica l proposit ions 
according to which: revolut ionary act ion must always 
be based on a doctr ine which can be s c i e n t i f i c a l l y 
determined; the working class by i t s e l f cannot 
achieve s u f f i c i e n t social consciousness to carry out 
i t s h i s t o r i c task of social revo lu t ion ; spontaneous 
act ion by the workers can only lead to defeat of the 
revo lu t ion . The revolut ion must be organized by 
professional revolut ionar ies of both pro le tar ian and 
i n te l l ec tua l o r i g i n . 
Liberal ism can be understood as an economic and 
p o l i t i c a l system which rests on the idea of l i b e r t y 
which is to be understood almost wholly in terms o f 
freedom from s ta te inter ference i n the actions o f an 
i nd i v i dua l . I t also means par t i c ipa t ion in government, 
rather thanbeing l e f t alone by the government. 
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Mannheim's 
Paradox: 
Marxism: 
According to Mannheim, a l l knowledge is 
r e l a t i o n a l ; and hence knowledge i t s e l f i s to be 
understood in terms of the re la t i on of the poss-
essor to the par t i cu la r h i s to r i ca l and social 
context in which he is th ink ing . But the paradox 
ar ises : what is the status of the theory that 
claims that a l l such knowledge is re la t ive? The 
paradox i s resolved by modern social theory because 
the social sc i en t i s t now can probe any aspect o f 
human organizat ion as dispassionately as physical 
science observes chemical react ions. 
The philosophical ideas expounded by Marx which 
attempted to provide ins ights in to the working of 
h is tory and society that transcend a par t i cu la r 
per iod. Marxism represents an especial ly powerful 
blend o f general proposit ions about man and society , 
a pungent c r i t i c i s m of the society of i t s t ime, the 
advocacy of po l ic ies of radical change, and a view 
of a mi l lenn ia l wor ld . 
Peaceful 
Co-existence: 
Refers to the condit ion o f in ternat ional re la t ions 
in which states wi th d iss im i la r social systems and 
antagonist ic ideologies l i v e side by side without 
f i g h t i n g . While "peace" normally implies some 
measure of pos i t ive in ternat ional co-operat ion, 
"co-existence" may mean l i t t l e more than that the 
states concerned re f ra in from war. 
Pragmatism: 
Socialism: 
A theory of truth that holds that an idea is true 
if it works satisfactorily; that is, if it leads 
to an anticipated experience. It has been used by 
political scientists to distinguish the "objective 
society" from the ideological society. According to 
these theorists, the pragmatic society is the opposite 
of the ideological society. 
Socialism and Communism are used by noncommunists in 
a radically different sense. Socialism is understood 
to involve a moderately planned economy (with some 
nationalization of industry) under a democratic 
government. According to this distinction many 
European parties are socialist - that is, they 
ascribe to social democracy - and the Soviet Union 
and China are communist. 
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Stalinism: 
Technology: 
Tota l i ta r ian ism: 
Welfare State: 
Insofar as theory is concerned, what can be 
said is that S ta l in l a i d greater emphasis than 
Lenin ever did on the p o s s i b i l i t y o f achieving 
"social ism" in one country. Since 1956, the 
term "Stal in ism" has been used by exponents o f 
communism in the Soviet Union to designate abuses 
o f Leninism which S ta l in pract iced. 
For the exponents o f the decl ine-of- ideology 
thes is , technology w i l l come to shrink the domain 
o f ideology because decisions w i l l be determined 
by the s c i e n t i f i c c r i t e r i a as well as technolog-
ica l c r i t e r i a . The c r i t i c a l ro le in the economy 
and p o l i t i c s w i l l be played by technical workers 
and the ro le of p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i ons w i l l diminish. 
Total ru le which allows j u s t one party. I t is based 
upon a s ingle party which retains i t s name from the 
time i t was f i gh t i ng for power. The party remains a 
minor i ty , con t ro l l i ng and purging i t s e l f . The rule 
o f the party knows no legal opposi t ion, only 
opponents who must be " l i qu ida ted" because they are 
i l l - n a t u r e d or i l l - d i sposed . 
The welfare state has f a i r l y e x p l i c i t commitments to 
the broad goals o f economic development; f u l l 
employment; equal i ty of opportunity fo r the young; 
social secu r i t y ; protected minimum standards as 
regards income, housing, heal th , and education for 
a l l regions and social groups. 
